

CSIS

Center for Strategic and International Studies

1800 K Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 775-3270

Updates from: CSIS.ORG, "Homeland Defense"

Comments to: Acordesman@aol.com

**DEFENDING AMERICA
REDEFINING THE CONCEPTUAL BORDERS
OF HOMELAND DEFENSE**

**HOMELAND DEFENSE: THE CURRENT AND
FUTURE TERRORIST THREAT**

Rough Draft for Comment

**Anthony H. Cordesman
Senior Fellow for Strategic Assessment**

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The following report is a rough initial draft section of a full report on Homeland Defense being prepared as part of the CSIS Homeland Defense project. It is a rough working draft, and reflects solely the views of the author and not of the CSIS team working on the project. It is being circulated for comment and reaction and will be substantially modified and updated before being included in the final report.

HOMELAND DEFENSE: THE CURRENT AND FUTURE TERRORIST THREATI

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 REVISION: SEPTEMBER 1, 2000.....i

INTRODUCTION..... 1

RISK ASSESSMENT: PLANNING FOR “NON-PATTERNS” AND POTENTIAL RISK 5

LOOKING BEYOND EMOTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM 5

PATTERNS AND NON-PATTERNS IN THE NUMBER OF ATTACKS..... 9

CASUALTIES VERSUS INCIDENTS: THE LACK OF CORRELATION..... 10

US AND AMERICAN CASUALTIES VERSUS INTERNATIONAL CASUALTIES 11

CONSIDERING THE THREAT FROM BOTH STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS..... 20

States, “Terrorists,” and Acts of War 20

Planning for Major Attacks and Asymmetric Warfare by State Actors 24

The Threat of “Proxies” and “Networks” 25

Dealing with Nuance and Complex Motives..... 26

**CONSIDERATION OF THE FULL SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE TYPES AND METHODS OF ATTACK: THE NEED TO
 CONSIDER “WORST CASES” 26**

MAKING OFFENSE, DETERRENCE, DENIAL, DEFENSE, AND RETALIATION PART OF HOMELAND DEFENSE.... 28

LINKING HOMELAND DEFENSE TO COUNTERPROLIFERATION..... 30

THREAT PRIORITIZATION: SEEKING TO IDENTIFY CURRENT AND 31

FUTURE THREATS 31

POTENTIAL STATE ACTORS 31

A Department of State Assessment of State Threats 33

A Department of Defense Assessment of Threats from Foreign States..... 37

*The Probable Lack of Well-Defined Strategic Warning of a Threat from State Actors and Unpredictable
 Behavior in a Crisis 40*

FOREIGN TERRORISTS AND EXTREMISTS..... 44

Continuing Threats and Counterterrorist Action..... 44

Major Foreign Terrorist Groups and Extremists..... 47

Threats from Foreign Students and Immigrants 58

DOMESTIC TERRORISTS AND EXTREMISTS 60

The Implications of Past Terrorist Attacks 63

PROBABILITY VERSUS PROBABILITY THEORY 69

List of Charts, Tables, and Figures

Table One	10
Attacks on the US Homeland versus Attacks on Other Regions.....	10
Table Two.....	14
Patterns in Total International and US Casualties from International Terrorism – Part One	14
Table Two.....	15
Patterns in Total International and US Casualties from International Terrorism – Part Two.....	15
Chart One	16
Terrorist Incidents Involving Americans vs. Total Incidents.....	16
Chart Two.....	17
Terrorist Incidents in the US: 1980-2000.....	17
Chart Three.....	18
Terrorist Casualties Involving Americans: 1987-1999.....	18
Chart Four.....	19
Anti-US Attacks by Region: 1994-1999	19
Table Three.....	43
Global Challenges: Who Has Weapons of Mass Destruction?	43
Table Four	64
Chronological Summary of Terrorist Incidents in the US: 1990-1997.....	64

Introduction

There is a wide spectrum of potential threats to the American homeland that do not involve the threat of overt attacks by states using long-range missiles or conventional military forces. Such threats include covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals, and independent terrorist and extremist attacks by residents of the US. These threats are currently limited in scope and frequency. No pattern of actual attacks on US territory has yet emerged that provides a clear basis for predicting how serious any given form of attack will be in the future, what means of attack will be used, or how lethal new forms of attack will be if they are successful.

As a result, there is a major ongoing debate over the seriousness of the threat and how the US government should react. A GAO report on terrorism summarizes the various views within the US government regarding these uncertainties as follows:¹

...there are three schools of thought on the terrorist threat: (1) some believe the threat and likelihood of terrorist attack is very low and does not pose a serious risk; (2) others believe the threat and likelihood of terrorist attack is high and could seriously disrupt the U.S. national and economic security; and (3) still others believe assessments of the threat and vulnerability to terrorist attack need to be accompanied by risk assessments to rationally guide the allocation of resources and attention. The expert further stated that such risk assessments would include analyses of vulnerability and susceptibility to terrorist attack and the severity of potential damage. According to U.S. intelligence agencies, conventional explosives continue to be the weapon of choice for terrorists. Although the probability of their use may increase over time, chemical and biological materials are less likely terrorist weapons because they are more difficult to weaponize and the results are unpredictable. Agency officials also noted that terrorist's use of nuclear weapons is the least likely scenario, although the consequences could be disastrous.

It is difficult to predict how these threats will evolve in the future. Potential attackers have good reason to fear American military power, and most are unlikely to launch such attacks without considering the risks. At the same time, America's very strengths create an incentive to attack it using asymmetric forms of warfare. The US homeland is vulnerable. Waging asymmetric warfare against the US offers both the greatest chance of success and the least risk of retaliation, and some key technologies are evolving in ways that aid the attacker. For example, biological warfare and information warfare will inevitably make the potential threat from both foreign and domestic attackers more serious over time.

It is equally difficult to predict whether attackers will emerge with both the capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. It is not difficult to predict that such attacks are possible. Attacks involving very large amounts of high explosives or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks have long been technically feasible, and the “globalization” of chemical and biological technologies and production facilities is making some weapons easier to develop or acquire. Nuclear proliferation continues and the levels of control over weapons, fissile material, and radioactive material are uncertain. Attacks using such weapons can involve a wide range of different levels of casualties, but they can involve attacks that could kill well over 10,000 to 100,000 Americans, with economic, physical, psychological, and political effects that are radically different from any covert, terrorist, or extremist attacks that have occurred to date.

These risks help explain why the US has steadily refined its policy toward terrorism and the risk of such attacks since Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism issued a report in 1985 which highlighted the need for improved, centralized interagency coordination of the significant federal assets to respond to terrorist incidents. The US response to potential threats from covert attacks by state actors, their proxies, or independent extremists and terrorists has changed even more since the mid-1990s.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law No.103-160, Section 1703 (50 USC 1522) mandated the coordination and integration of all Department of Defense chemical and biological (CB) defense programs. As part of this coordination and integration, the Secretary of Defense was directed to submit an assessment and a description of plans to improve readiness to survive, fight and win in a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) contaminated environment.

The bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City led to the issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) in June 1995. PDD-39 built on the previous directive and contained three key elements of a national strategy for combating terrorism: (1) reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks and prevent and deter terrorist acts before they occur; (2) respond to terrorist acts that do occur – crisis management – and apprehend and punish terrorists;

and (3) manage the consequences of terrorist acts, including providing emergency relief and restoring capabilities to protect public health and safety and essential government services. This directive also further elaborates on agencies' roles and responsibilities and some specific measures to be taken regarding each element of the strategy.²

These policies have since been further developed by two key Presidential Decision Directives, PDD-62 and PDD-63, which were issued in 1998. PDD-62 reaffirmed the basic principles of PDD-39, but clarified and reinforced the specific missions of the US agencies charged with defeating and defending against terrorism, and created a new and more systematic federal approach to fighting the emerging threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This includes programs to deter terrorist incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and to manage the consequences if such incidents should occur. PDD-63 called for a national effort to assure the security of critical infrastructure. It covers both critical infrastructure protection and cyber crime, and the security of both government and private sector infrastructure to ensure national security, national economic security, and public health and safety.

New legislation has also shaped US policy. "The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act," contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (title XIV of P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23, 1996), established the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program. This act made the Department of Defense the lead federal agency for implementing the program, and is to work in cooperation with the FBI, the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.³ Equally important, major new funds have been spent on federal programs to deal with these threats, and federal spending increased by at least 43% between FY1998 and FY2001.

At the same time, there is no way for federal, state, and local governments to predict what attackers will actually take the risk of launching attacks on the US, or to predict the kind of event or crisis that could suddenly change their willingness to use any given means and level of attack. There are no clear boundaries that separate one form of attack from another, or that allow the US

government to predict where and how it will have to attack to defend against an attack or to respond to one.

While it is tempting for governments to plan for the kind of cleanly defined single incident with which governments can best cope, there is no reason to assume that an attacker must follow such rules. Multiple attacks can greatly complicate defense and response and use different means of attack. A single attack can use a variety of weapons ranging from a mix of biological agents to a mix of chemical and information warfare. One attacker can piggyback on the attack of another, and attacks on the US homeland can be linked to attacks on Americans overseas or our allies. The very threat of an attack can be used to try to deter the US from attacking or exercising its diplomatic or military power, or it can be used to try to force a domestic political agenda on federal, state, or local governments.

Equally important, homeland defense must respond to a constantly changing threat. Many of the actions necessary to defend the American homeland will take years – sometimes well over a decade – to fully implement. In many cases, research and development is required, and the end result must then be transformed into deployed and effective capabilities at the federal, state, and local level. Such action can only be cost-effective, however, if it has a reasonable life cycle or period of effectiveness.

As a result, the US must make decisions now to shape programs that will affect its capabilities as much as a quarter of a century in the future. It must do so knowing that it cannot predict what new threats will or will not emerge, and that grave uncertainties exist regarding the emergence of new methods of attack and defense, and the balance of technology between them. The world can evolve in radically different directions, and is almost certain to do so. The level of foreign threats can vary sharply by region, and the level of domestic threats can change strikingly. Santayana's warning that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it is as valid as ever, but those who ignore the uncertainty of future change may well face far more serious problems.

These uncertainties have polarized part of the debate over the threat posed by weapons of

mass destruction and attacks producing mass casualties. There are those who believe passionately that such attacks on the US homeland are inevitable. There are those who believe the threat is unreal, and its an exaggeration that has grown out the search for new threats following the end of the Cold War. There are debates over how the threat should be categorized and prioritized, what response measures are needed, if any, and what kinds of attack are most likely. So far, these debates have provided many insights as to what may happen, but no basis for resolving the many uncertainties involved.

Risk Assessment: Planning for “Non-Patterns” and Potential Risk

One of the greatest single problems the US faces in dealing with the threat posed by CBRN attacks is that there is no way to predict the probable nature of the threat that can be firmly rooted in either an analysis of past patterns of attack, or a clearly identifiable threat from specific countries, or foreign and domestic extremists. Furthermore, US planning and analysis often tends to react to an emotive and generic approach to terrorism, and/or generalize from patterns and incidents that simply do not justify such generalizations.

Looking Beyond Emotional Definitions of Terrorism

Many elements of the US government seem to find it difficult to accept the fact that asymmetric warfare is only illegal or illegitimate in the eyes of the US, and that the future threat posed by covert or proxy attacks by state actors may be at least as important, and far more lethal, than the threat posed by foreign and domestic terrorist/extremist groups and individuals.

With the exception of the Department of Defense and the CIA, the US government tends to use a relatively narrow definition of the word terrorism based on the currently most probable threats rather than examine the full range of possible asymmetric threats and consider how they may evolve over time.

This focus on “terrorism” has three major negative side effects. First, the threat analysis and characterization is based on the idea that the threat to the American homeland comes only

from illegal or illegitimate actors, driven largely by extreme political or ideological motives. Second, it leads federal planners to downplay or ignore the risk that governments may launch covert CBRN attacks against the US or use proxies to do so, giving “terrorists” an access to far more sophisticated weapons than would otherwise be the case. Finally, it leads many agencies to define threats in terms of attacks which would produce limited to moderate casualties, with 10,000 deaths or less. The use of the term “terrorism” is often taken to imply attacks by small groups or independent organizations, rather than warfare by states, and the problem is compounded by the fact that federal agencies use different definitions of terrorism:

- The State Department uses a statutory definition of terrorism: “premeditated, politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”⁴
- The FBI defines terrorism more broadly as: “the unlawful use of violence, committed by a group of two or more individuals against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” The FBI’s definition of terrorism is broader than State’s definition, in that the terrorist act can be done by a group of two or more individuals for social as well as political objectives. Because of this broader definition, the FBI includes in its annual reports on terrorism in the United States acts such as bombings, arson, kidnapping, assaults, and hijackings committed by persons who may be suspected of associating with militia groups, animal rights groups, and others. Federal agencies also use different terms to describe their programs and activities for combating terrorism. For example, FBI uses “counterterrorism” to refer to the full range of its activities directed against terrorism, including preventive and crisis management efforts. On the other hand, DOD uses the term “counterterrorism” to refer to offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist attack and “antiterrorism” to cover defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts.⁵
- The Federal Emergency Management Agency defines terrorism as: “Terrorism is the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of the United States for purposes of intimidation, coercion or ransom. Terrorists often use threats to create fear among the public, to try to convince citizens that their government is powerless to prevent terrorism, and to get immediate publicity for their causes.”⁶
- The GAO uses the term “combat terrorism” to refer to the full range of federal programs and activities applied against terrorism, domestically and abroad, regardless of the source or motive.
- The Rand Corporation definition of terrorism is: “Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, through acts designed to coerce others into actions they otherwise would not

undertake or into refraining from actions that they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violations of the rules of war, if a state of war existed.”⁷

The US may wish to define all asymmetric warfare as “terrorism,” and there are good propaganda reasons for doing so. The same is true of references to international law, “rules of war,” and “states of war.” From a functional perspective; however, referring to international norms that do not exist does not encourage objective planning and analysis. Neither does using definitions of “terrorism” that include virtually any act of violence other than one committed in the context of a declared war and involving the overt use of a properly identified military weapons system in full compliance with the most stringent interpretation of the Geneva convention. The proof lies in the fact that a number of federal agencies do not currently fit covert or proxy attacks by states fit into their rhetoric, while other exclude the unstable, insane, criminal, and religiously motivated. Homeland defense must respond to the full range of threats.

Much of the federal literature on the risks posed by CBRN and WMD attacks understates the problem of uncertainty. At least in the open literature, there also seems to be (a) a lack of sophisticated pattern analysis and threat characterization, (b) a failure to look beyond past patterns of attack and examine the full range of possible futures, (c) a lack of explicit near and mid-term net assessments of how the balance of means of attack can evolve relative to defensive and response options, (d) a failure to analyze the nature and impact of the many uncertainties in CBRN lethality and effects data, and (e) a reluctance to explicitly consider the full implications of large-scale and complex attack options for both response and defense.

There is nothing new about potential threats to the US from terrorism, or even terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. There were at least 52 incidents of terrorist threats to use weapons of mass destruction between 1968-1994.⁸ However, there is no agreement within the federal government as to how to count and categorize the past pattern of threats to the US homeland. Furthermore, some departments and agencies count attempts in ways clearly designed to suit their programs without defining the attempts in terms of seriousness and capability. Some threat counts seem to define every lunatic in the US that writes or speaks the word “anthrax” as a terrorist threat.

Many analysts do firmly believe that the terrorist threat to the United States is increasing, and so is the potential willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. A June 2000 report by the National Commission on Terrorism stated:⁹

...If most of the world's countries are firmer in opposing terrorism, some still support terrorists or use terrorism as an element of state policy. Iran is the clearest case. The Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of intelligence and Security carry out terrorist activities and give direction and support to other terrorists. The regimes of Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan provide funding, refuge, training bases, and weapons to terrorists. Libya continues to provide support to some Palestinian terrorist groups and to harass expatriate dissidents, and North Korea may still provide weapons to terrorists. Cuba provides safehaven to a number of terrorists. Other states allow terrorist groups to operate on their soil or provide support that, while failing short of state sponsorship, nonetheless gives terrorists important assistance.

The terrorist threat is also changing in ways that make it more dangerous and difficult to counter.

International terrorism once threatened Americans only when they were outside the country. Today international terrorists attack us on our own soil. Just before the millennium, an alert U.S. Customs Service official stopped Ahmad Ressaam as he attempted to enter the United States from Canada-- apparently to conduct a terrorist attack. This fortuitous arrest should not inspire complacency, however. On an average day, over one million people enter the United States legally and thousands more enter illegally. As the World Trade Center bombing demonstrated, we cannot rely solely on existing border controls and procedures to keep foreign terrorists out of the United States.

Terrorist attacks are becoming more lethal. Most terrorist organizations active in the 1970s and 1980s had clear political objectives. They tried to calibrate their attacks to produce just enough bloodshed to get attention for their cause, but not so much as to alienate public support. Groups like the Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization often sought specific political concessions.

Now, a growing percentage of terrorist attacks are designed to kill as many people as possible. In the 1990s a terrorist incident was almost 20 percent more likely to result in death or injury than an incident two decades ago. The World Trade Center bombing in New York killed six and wounded about 1,000, but the terrorists' goal was to topple the twin towers, killing tens of thousands of people. The thwarted attacks against New York City's infrastructure in 1993-- which included plans to bomb the Lincoln and Holland tunnels-- also were intended to cause mass casualties. In 1995, Philippine authorities uncovered a terrorist plot to bring down 11 U.S. airliners in Asia. The circumstances surrounding the millennium border arrests of foreign nationals suggest that the suspects planned to target a large group assembled for a New Year's celebration. Overseas attacks against the United States in recent years have followed the same trend. The bombs that destroyed the military barracks in Saudi Arabia and two U.S. Embassies in Africa inflicted 6,059 casualties. Those arrested in Jordan in late December had also planned attacks designed to kill large numbers.

The trend toward higher casualties reflects, in part, the changing motivation of today's terrorists. Religiously motivated terrorist groups, such as Usama bin Ladin's group, al-Qaida, which is believed to have bombed the U.S. Embassies in Africa, represent a growing trend toward hatred of the United States. Other terrorist groups are driven by visions of a post-apocalyptic future or by ethnic hatred. Such groups may lack a concrete political goal other than to punish their enemies by killing as many of them as possible, seemingly without concern about alienating sympathizers. Increasingly, attacks are less likely to be followed by claims of responsibility or lists of political demands.

The shift in terrorist motives has contributed to a change in the way some international terrorist groups are structured. Because groups based on ideological or religious motives may lack a specific political or

nationalistic agenda, they have less need for a hierarchical structure. Instead, they can rely on loose affiliations with like-minded groups from a variety of countries to support their common cause against the United States.

Al-Qaida is the best-known transnational terrorist organization. In addition to pursuing its own terrorist campaign, it calls on numerous militant groups that share some of its ideological beliefs to support its violent campaign against the United States. But neither al-Qaida's extremist politico-religious beliefs nor its leader, Usama bin Ladin, is unique. If al-Qaida and Usama bin Ladin were to disappear tomorrow, the United States would still face potential terrorist threats from a growing number of groups opposed to perceived American hegemony. Moreover, new terrorist threats can suddenly emerge from isolated conspiracies or obscure cults with no previous history of violence.

Patterns and Non-Patterns in the Number of Attacks

The problems described in this report are all too real. At the same time, the incidents it cites do not provide conclusive evidence that shows there is a trend towards an increased terrorist threat to the United States. The US has not yet been the target of extensive covert attacks by either foreign states or terrorists and extremists. In fact, US territory has been surprisingly free of such attacks by state actors, extremists, or independent terrorists when one examines the patterns of attack with those in other regions.¹⁰ According to the State Department's numbers, terrorist incidents in the US have declined sharply since the early 1980s, when they averaged 30-50 a year, and there has only been one incident in the US involving casualty levels approaching "superterrorism": the World Trade Center bombing in 1993.

Table One summarizes these patterns, and is a warning about the dangers of oversimplified pattern analysis in terrorism. There are striking sudden variations in the number of incidents by region, and in the overall frequency of terrorism. Perceptions also rarely track with reality. The Middle East, for example, is often seen as the center of global terrorism. In practice, however, this has not been true since the early 1990s, and the Middle East has recently ranked as a region with a relatively low number of terrorist incidents.

Table OneAttacks on the US Homeland versus Attacks on Other Regions

<u>Total International Terrorist Attacks by Region</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>
Africa	-	-	-	-	6	25	10	11	11	21	52
Asia	-	-	-	-	37	24	16	11	21	49	72
Eurasia	-	-	-	-	5	11	5	24	42	14	35
Latin America	-	-	-	-	97	58	92	84	128	110	116
Middle East	-	-	-	-	100	116	45	45	37	31	25
Western Europe	-	-	-	-	185	88	272	121	52	48	85
North America	-	-	-	-	1	0	0	0	13	0	2
Total – Worldwide	375	437	565	363	431	322	440	296	304	273	387

Source: Adapted from US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 1999, and Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 2000.

It should be noted that there are severe definitional problems in the numbers shown in Table One, which represent long-standing problems in the way the US State Department analyzes terrorism and which deprives its analysis of much of its potential value. The State Department only counts acts of terrorism with a political motive, and does not count acts where the motive might be religious, quasi-criminal, or is simply irrational. There have been major attacks on US embassies, airliners, barracks, and private sector facilities *outside* the US, and some have been sufficiently violent to indicate that if the attackers had had weapons of mass destruction they might have used them. There also have been *serious* attempts which did not succeed and which are not counted. Furthermore, there is no clear correlation between the number of attacks and the seriousness of the consequences.

Casualties versus Incidents: The Lack of Correlation

The historical pattern in the total casualties from all attacks is shown in Table Two, along with the number of American casualties. There is a rise in the number of American casualties, but they remain a small proportion of the total, and most occurred outside the US. As such, these data do not support an estimate that the US homeland is now the subject of an emerging pattern

of attack, and Americans remain a small portion of the total casualties in any given year.

At the same time, it is clear that foreign states, extremists, and terrorists have been willing to attack Americans in the past and that the US does not enjoy any special immunity. These data also do not cover attempts, as distinguished from successes. For example, shortly before the celebration of the millennium, Customs agents arrested an Algerian national smuggling almost 50 pounds of explosive materials and detonating devices into the United States. The other Algerians subsequently arrested in connection with this plot apparently were "Afghan alumni," trained with the Mujahedin in Afghanistan and with some links to Usama bin Laden.

It is also clear from Table Two, and from the additional data in Charts 1-4, that the patterns in the number of incidents and casualties vary sharply by year, and do not provide a way to predict the size of the casualties in a given region.

- For example, the State Department reported that the number of international terrorist incidents fell from a peak of 665 in 1987 to 296 in 1996, a 25-year low. Of the 296 international incidents during 1996, only 73 were against U.S. persons and facilities overseas. However, the total casualties resulting from international terrorist incidents during 1996 were among the highest ever recorded--311 persons killed and 2,652 wounded. A total of 24 Americans were killed and 250 Americans were wounded.¹¹ Moreover, by 1999, the number of terrorist incidents had climbed back to a more normal number: 387.
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recorded 23 recorded acts of terrorism in the United States between 1989 and the end of 1993. It only recorded one domestic terrorist incident in the United States in 1995, but this was the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City. That incident was the most destructive ever on U.S. soil. It killed 168 and wounded 500 persons.¹²
- There were a total of 111 attacks on US citizens in 1998. These attacks only resulted in 23 US casualties, but many of the attacks used exceptionally violent means. A total of 96 out of 111 attacks used bombs, and an additional five were fire bombings.¹³ The number of attacks rose to 169 in 1999, including 111 bombings, 12 firebombings, 11 armed attacks, 3 hijackings, and 22 kidnappings.

US and American Casualties versus International

Casualties

The most serious limitation in the data currently available on the patterns in terrorism is that there is no reliable open source estimate of the number of attempts to conduct large-scale attacks, or to use CBRN weapons. As a result, some analysts conclude that these patterns do not reveal any serious risk while others conclude that attacks like those by Aum Shinrikyo are evidence of a growing trend towards WMD attacks because they could have been far more deadly if the movement had used Sarin more intelligently or succeeded in effectively weaponizing Anthrax.

There is no way to resolve this debate from pattern analysis per se. It seems likely that intended lethality of many attempted attacks was considerably more lethal than the end result, and the limited casualties shown in Table Two are more a result of poor planning and/or lack of access to more lethal means than of any deliberate effort at restraint. Parts One and Two of Table Two show that limited number of casualties that are US citizens grossly understates the number of actual casualties from attacks on US facilities and in attacks in which there are some US casualties. For example such attacks produced a total of 184 killed and wounded in 1999, of which 133 were businessmen, 9 were diplomats, 9 were military, 7 were in government, and 26 were "other." The State Department reports that only 11 casualties that were US citizens, and it is clear that the number of US casualties would rise sharply if more terrorist attacks had been executed at the US homeland.

At the same time, the kind of data shown in Table Two and Charts One-Four do not support any kind of statistically valid pattern analysis that can lead to reliable estimates of the nature of future attacks on the US homeland. If anything, the variations in the data are so wide that they provide a statistical "proof" that there is no empirical basis for predicting future patterns that goes beyond pure speculation. Analysts of terrorism may assert anything they please, but there simply is no evidence to support such assertions that can be tied to the negligible number of terrorist attacks that have as yet occurred in the US or the highly erratic patterns in attacks outside the US. If anything, the patterns to date would indicate that there is little meaningful foreign threat to the US homeland and terrorism is something that happens

outside it.

Table TwoPatterns in Total International and US Casualties from International Terrorism – Part One

<u>Total International Casualties From Terrorism by Region (Total, all nationalities)</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>
Africa	-	-	7	55	8	80	28	5,379	185
Asia	-	-	135	17	5,639	1,507	344	635	690
Eurasia	-	-	1	151	29	20	27	12	3
Latin America	-	-	66	329	46	18	11	194	9
Middle East	-	-	178	256	445	1,097	480	68	31
Western Europe	-	-	117	126	287	503	17	405	16
North America	-	-	1,006	0	0	0	7	0	0
World Wide (Total, all nationalities)	-	-	1,510	934	6,446	3,225	914	7,053	934
<u>Total US Citizen Casualties</u>									
Dead	7	1	7	6	10	25	6	12	5
Wounded	16	2	1,004	5	60	510	21	11	6
Total	23	3	1,011	11	70	535	27	23	11


Table TwoPatterns in Total International and US Casualties from International Terrorism – Part Two

<u>Patterns in Anti-US Attacks</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>
<u>Anti-US Attacks By Region</u>									
Africa	-	-	-	4	3	2	2	3	16
Asia	-	-	-	5	6	1	6	0	6
Eurasia	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	3	9
Middle East	-	-	-	8	6	3	4	5	11
Europe	-	-	-	5	21	8	7	13	30
Latin America	-	-	-	44	62	58	97	87	96
Total	-	-	-	66	99	73	123	111	169
<u>Anti US Attacks by Type of Event</u>									
Armed attack	-	-	-	9	8	3	5	5	11
Vandalism	-	-	-	1	9	0	0	0	0
Barricade Hostage	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	1
Occupation	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	2
Hijacking	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	3
Arson	-	-	-	0	6	7	2	1	6
Assault	-	-	-	1	0	1	0	0	0
Kidnapping	-	-	-	10	11	6	8	4	20
Bombing	-	-	-	43	65	55	108	96	111
Fire Bombing	-	-	-	2	0	1	0	5	12
Total	-	-	-	66	99	73	123	111	169
Total Worldwide Casualties from Attacks on US Facilities and Attacks in Which US Citizens Suffered Casualties									
Other	-	-	-	26	22	19	14	3	26
Government	-	-	-	1	2	1	4	0	7
Military	-	-	-	0	2	4	1	0	9
Diplomat	-	-	-	2	6	1	3	19	9
Business	-	-	-	38	70	50	104	1	133
Total	-	-	-	66	102	75	128	23	184

Adapted from US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994 through the 1999 edition, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

Chart One


Terrorist Incidents Involving Americans vs. Total Incidents



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from DCI Counterterrorist Center, "International Terrorism in 1997: A Statistic View, CIA Web Page www.odci.gov/cia/di/productions/terrorism, March 1998, and US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994 through the 1999 edition, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Chart Two


Terrorist Incidents in the US: 1980-2000



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from DCI Counterterrorist Center, "International Terrorism in 1997: A Statistical" View, CIA Web Page www.odci.gov/cia/di/productions/terrorism, March 1998 and GAO/NSIAD-97-254, p. 14.

Chart Three


Terrorist Casualties Involving Americans: 1987-1999



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from DCI Counterterrorist Center, "International Terrorism in 1997: A Statistic View, CIA Web Page www.odci.gov/cia/di/productions/terrorism, March 1998, and US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994 through the 1999 edition, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Chart Four

Anti-US Attacks by Region: 1994-1999



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from DCI Counterterrorist Center, "International Terrorism in 1997: A Statistic View, CIA Web Page www.odci.gov/cia/di/productions/terrorism, March 1998

Considering the Threat from both State and Non-State Actors

Even if pattern analysis on the past patterns of “terrorism” did provide clearer results, it is far from certain that it would provide a useful picture of the present and future threat posed to the American homeland. This threat is not limited to terrorism per se, but rather the combination of threats posed by asymmetric warfare, covert attacks, proxy attacks, *and* what the US now normally labels “terrorism.” It also includes the threat posed by foreign *and domestic* extremist violence, regardless of whether attacks have a political motive. Accordingly, there are serious dangers in focusing attention on the historical threat posed by relatively limited attacks by small groups and individuals, rather than the much larger threats that can be posed by state-sponsored asymmetric warfare.

States, “Terrorists,” and Acts of War

The threat that states will play a role in launching or supporting large-scale attacks is clearly recognized in US strategy and in the Department of Defense doctrine. However, the semantic loading that other agencies give to the term “terrorist” leads some officials and analysts to ignore the potential seriousness of covert or proxy attacks driven by state actors. It also leads some planners to ignore the fact that there are no true international norms that prevent such forms of asymmetric warfare – regardless of whether the US and its allies would like to create them.

For example, some of the recent US analysis of response measures focuses on attacks of relatively limited size and consequences. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (including the Center for Disease Control (CDC), do not have a working definition of mass casualties. The metropolitan medical response systems that HHS is establishing across the nation, however, use 1,000 casualties for planning local medical systems and for equipping and supplying the response teams, even though the HHS states that its planning considers three tiers of threats: one thousand casualties or less, one thousand to ten

thousand casualties, and ten thousand casualties or more.¹⁴

Similarly, a number of the GAO analyses that deal with “Combating Terrorism” have concluded that the risk of covert attacks or terrorist incidents using weapons of mass destruction might be limited because small independent terrorist groups and extremists would be unable to acquire or build sophisticated and highly lethal weapons. This kind of reasoning could lead the US to ignore the fact that it faces an equally serious threat of covert or indirect attacks by states that could use such weapons and produce casualties far in excess of 10,000.¹⁵

The US government officials that do warn of CBRN attacks tend to focus on relatively limited uses of such weapons by terrorist organizations. Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, has warned on a number of occasions that the US must plan to deal with attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, and has quoted statistics on attempted acts of terrorism which are less reassuring than the data on successful acts of terrorism quoted earlier. At the same time, he has focused on criminal cases and terrorism:¹⁶

The FBI views the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a serious and growing threat to our national security. Pursuant to our terrorism mandate and statutory requirements, we are developing within the inter-agency setting broad-based, pro-active programs in support of our mission to detect, deter, or prevent the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their delivery systems, and WMD proliferation activities occurring in or directed at the United States.

Our programs cover the broad spectrum of Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI), criminal and counterterrorism investigations, focusing on persons or organizations involved in WMD proliferation activities.

During 1997, the FBI initiated over 100 criminal cases pertaining to nuclear, biological and chemical threats, incidents, or investigations (excluding Proliferation cases). Many of these threats were determined to be non-credible; however, this represents a three fold increase over 1996. Credible cases have resulted in arrests and prosecutions by the FBI, and state and local authorities. In support of this growing problem, legislative changes by Congress over the past three years have strengthened the FBI’s powers to investigate and bring to prosecution those individuals involved in WMD proliferation.

The FBI has also investigated and responded to a number of threats that involved biological agents and are attributed to various types of groups or individuals. For example, there have been apocalyptic-type threats that actually advocate destruction of the world through the use of WMD. We have also been made aware of interest in biological agents by individuals espousing white-supremacist beliefs to achieve social change; individuals engaging in criminal activity, frequently arising from jealousy or interpersonal conflict; individuals and small anti-tax groups, and some cult interest. In most cases, threats have been limited in scope and have targeted individuals rather than groups, facilities, or critical infrastructure. Threats have surfaced which advocate dissemination of a chemical agent through air ventilation systems. Most have made little mention of the type of device or delivery system to be employed, and for this reason have been deemed technically not feasible. Some threats have been validated. As an example, during 1997, a group

with white supremacist views pled guilty to planning to explode tanks containing the deadly industrial chemical hydrogen sulfide as a diversionary act to their primary activity, an armored car robbery.

The FBI has experienced an increase in the number of cases involving terrorist or criminal use of WMD. These cases frequently have been small in scale and committed primarily by individuals or smaller splinter/extremist elements of right wing groups that are unrelated to larger terrorist organizations.

For example: As most of you will remember, on April 24, 1997, B'nai B'rith headquarters in Washington, D.C. received a package containing a petri dish labeled "Anthraxis Yersinia," a non-existent substance and a threat letter. Although testing failed to substantiate the perceived threat, the significant response mobilized to mitigate the situation highlights the disruption, fears, and complexity associated with these types of cases.

On September 17, 1997, an individual was indicted in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. Section 175(A)/Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act for knowingly possessing a toxin (ricin and nicotine sulfate) for use as a weapon and knowingly possessing a delivery system designed to deliver or disseminate a toxin. On October 28, 1997, he pled guilty to manufacturing a toxin (ricin) for use as a weapon. On January 7, 1998, he was sentenced to 12 years and 7 months in federal prison to be followed by 5 years of supervised release.

In what the FBI considers a significant prevention, the FBI arrested four members of a white supremacist organization in Dallas, Texas, who planned to bomb a natural gas refinery, which could have caused a release of a deadly cloud of Hydrogen Sulfide. This act was planned to divert law enforcement attention from the group's original objective of committing an armored car robbery. On video, the subjects discussed their complete disregard for the devastating consequences of their intended actions. The four were indicted on several charges to include Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The group pled guilty to several criminal charges and are awaiting sentencing.

Mrs. Barbara Y. Martinez, the Deputy Director of the FBI for National Domestic Preparedness Office gave a similar warning in 1999,¹⁷

Terrorist events such as the World Trade Center bombing, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City, and the pipe bomb at the Olympic Games in Atlanta revealed the United States' increased susceptibility to terrorist assaults. These attacks, coupled with the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack, where the weapon was the chemical nerve agent Sarin, exposed the threat of use of WMD within the United States. The threat of WMD use in the United States is real, however, we must not inflate nor understate the actual threat. The United States is experiencing an increased number of hoaxes involving the use of chemical or biological agents perpetrated by individuals wishing to instill fear and disrupt communities. Yesterday's bomb threat has been replaced with a more exotic biological or chemical threat. While the FBI continues to investigate these hoaxes, other on-going investigations reveal that domestic extremists, as well as international terrorists with open anti-U.S. sentiments, are becoming more interested in the potential use of chemical and biological agents.

Examining the increased number of WMD criminal cases, the FBI has opened over the past several years highlights the potential threat of use we face. WMD criminal cases are those cases primarily dealing with the use, threatened use, or procurement of chemical and biological materials with intent to harm within the United States. These criminal cases have shown a steady increase since 1995, rising from 37 in 1996 to 74 in 1997, 181 in 1998, and 114 to date for 1999, with three-quarters of these cases threatening a biological release. The biological agent most often cited in 1998 and 1999 was anthrax. Despite the increase in fabricated threats, the WMD threat remains. Since the early 1990s, the FBI has investigated a number of domestic extremist groups and associated individuals interested in procuring or ready to employ chemical

or biological agents against innocent civilians. In February 1999, members of a right-wing splinter group were sentenced to 292 months (over 24 years) in prison for threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction against federal officials. These individuals intended to modify a cigarette lighter in order to shoot cactus quills tainted with HIV-blood or rabies.

The same is true of the CIA. Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, warned in March 2000 that,¹⁸

...Although 1999 did not witness the dramatic terrorist attacks that punctuated 1998, our profile in the world and thus our attraction as a terrorist target will not diminish any time soon. We are learning more about the perpetrators every day... and I can tell you that they are a diverse lot motivated by many causes.

Usama Bin Ladin is still foremost among these terrorists, because of the immediacy and seriousness of the threat he poses. The connections between Bin Ladin and the threats uncovered in Jordan, Canada and the United States during the holidays are still being investigated, but everything we have learned recently confirms our conviction that he wants to strike further blows against America. Despite these and other well-publicized disruptions, we believe he could still strike without additional warning. Indeed, Usama Bin Ladin's organization and other terrorist groups are placing increased emphasis on developing surrogates to carry out attacks in an effort to avoid detection. For example, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) is linked closely to Bin Ladin's organization and has operatives located around the world--including in Europe, Yemen, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. And, there is now an intricate web of alliances among Sunni extremists worldwide, including North Africans, radical Palestinians, Pakistanis, and Central Asians.

I am also very concerned about the continued threat Islamic extremist groups pose to the Middle East Peace Process. The Palestinian rejectionist groups, HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) and PIJ (Palestine Islamic Jihad), as well as Lebanese Hizbollah continue to plan attacks against Israel aimed at blocking progress in the negotiations. HAMAS and PIJ have been weakened by Israeli and Palestinian Authority crackdowns, but remain capable of conducting large scale attacks. Recent Israeli arrests of HAMAS terrorist operatives revealed that the group had plans underway for major operations inside Israel.

Some of these terrorist groups are actively sponsored by national governments that harbor great antipathy toward the United States. Although we have seen some dramatic public pressure for liberalization in Iran, which I will address later, and even some public criticism of the security apparatus, the fact remains we have yet to find evidence that the use of terrorism as a political tool by official Iranian organs has changed since President Khatami took office in August 1997.

Mr. Chairman, we remain concerned that terrorist groups worldwide continue to explore how rapidly evolving and spreading technologies might enhance the lethality of their operations. Although terrorists we've preempted still appear to be relying on conventional weapons, we know that a number of these groups are seeking chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents. We are aware of several instances in which terrorists have contemplated using these materials.

- Among them is Bin Ladin, who has shown a strong interest in chemical weapons. His operatives have trained to conduct attacks with toxic chemicals or biological toxins.
- HAMAS is also pursuing a capability to conduct attacks with toxic chemicals.

Terrorists also are embracing the opportunities offered by recent leaps in information technology. To a greater and greater degree, terrorist groups, including Hizbollah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization, and Bin Ladin's al Qa'ida organization are using computerized files, e-mail, and encryption to support their operations.

...we have had our share of successes, but I must be frank in saying that this has only succeeded in buying time against an increasingly dangerous threat. The difficulty in destroying this threat lies in the fact that our efforts will not be enough to overcome the fundamental causes of the phenomenon -- poverty, alienation,

disaffection, and ethnic hatreds deeply rooted in history. In the meantime, constant vigilance and timely intelligence are our best weapons.

There are good reasons for the priorities that are implicit in these statements. Conventional attacks on the US homeland are ongoing threats, and are now more probable than the US of weapons of mass destruction. Comparatively low levels of WMD attacks are now more probable than high level WMD attacks. At the same time, the tacit assumption that state actors will not attack in the future can lead to a seriously distorted American approach to homeland defense.

Planning for Major Attacks and Asymmetric Warfare by State Actors

It may be valid to label state actors as “terrorists” when they or their proxies attack innocent civilians or economic targets without a declaration of war. However, once again such labeling has such a heavy emotional content that it may lead US planners to pay insufficient attention to the fact that most hostile states have little choice other than to wage asymmetric warfare, and may pursue rational and focused strategies that are only acts of “terrorism” when seen from an American perspective. The US lives in a world where there are many current and potentially hostile states. It makes good sense to call such states “enemies,” but labeling them as “terrorist” is as dysfunctional in some ways as calling them “freedom fighters.”

Ironically, the now-dated US use of the term “rogue state” never seemed to have led the US government to take the possibility of such attacks as seriously as it did the risk of Soviet use of unconventional warfare during the Cold War. The US has also downplayed the mid- and long-term risk of such attacks from states like China. These are states that have little near term prospect of becoming peer threats, but which could develop extremely lethal forms of asymmetric threats to the US homeland. It is not yet clear what talking about “states of concern” means, but the phrase does not seem to convey much urgency about dealing with asymmetric warfare (or anything else).

Such statements do, however, help show illustrate diverse the threat really is. They also help show why homeland defense must plan for attacks using weapons of mass destruction. Just as there is no way to predict whether attacks on the US homeland will be made by states, proxies,

independent non-state actors, and/or terrorists/extremists, there is no way to predict what mix of different kinds of weapons will be used, whether weapons of mass destruction will be used, or whether equally costly attacks can be carried out using conventional explosives.

An effective homeland defense strategy must look beyond the threats posed by individuals and private groups, and take account of the fact that other states can launch direct asymmetric attacks on the American homeland. These attacks may or may not be covert in the sense an effort is made to conceal the state responsible, the nature of the attack, or that the attack has taken place at all. States may also use proxies like terrorists or extremists. In all of these cases, if the primary sponsor is a hostile state, such attacks become an act of war and must be treated as such.

The Threat of “Proxies” and “Networks”

The US must give equal priority to assessing the risks posed by the links between states and non-state actors and by the secondary links between various non-state groups. A significant amount of the present open literature on terrorism assumes that such networks and common interests already exist. It often does so on the basis of insufficient evidence or without regard to the limits of such ties. At the same time, insufficient attention seems to be paid to the ways in which future transfers of technology, weapons of mass destruction, and money can take place between states and such groups in the future. The assumption often seems to be that potentially hostile states will not take the risk of aiding terrorist and extremist groups in CBRN attacks in peacetime. While this may well be true, risk perceptions can change radically in a crisis or war.

The US politicizes links between states and terrorists/extremist in ways that can be severely misleading. For example, current State Department reporting sharply downplays Syria's role in supporting the Hizbollah in proxy attacks on Israel and exaggerates the role of Iran by default. Pakistan's role in support Bin Laden and Afghan extremists, and the role of Saudi and other sources of terrorist financing, has also been downplayed for political reasons.

Dealing with Nuance and Complex Motives

There is also a tendency to over-simplify the radically differing nature of terrorist and extremist groups that have no currently visible ties to states. Far too much of the public official US literature on such groups lumps them together as if their motives, behavior, and capabilities were similar. Buzz words are developed to characterize terrorists as “right,” “left,” “religious,” “lone,” “fanatic,” “leaderless,” “rational,” and “irrational.” As a result, there seems to be little independent assessment of which groups might act as proxies or in alliance with hostile states. Such an approach fails to develop a nuanced approach as to exactly what given groups and types of individuals believe in, and whether they do or do not pose a direct threat to the American homeland. In the process, it ignores the long history of the sudden appearance of factions and splinter groups and the fact they often are willing to take far more extreme risks than their parent group or the state(s) that fund it.

Accurate intelligence on the character and dynamics of every group – and its level of outside and state support – may not be possible, but every effort needs to be made to clearly distinguish between given groups and to determine what they may be able to do with or without state aid and on a continuing basis. Groups and individuals may emerge that are willing to attack the American homeland with little regard to US retaliation and with few goals other than causing the maximum amount of damage to American citizens and institutions. Their political agendas could include complex political and religious ideologies, pragmatic strategic and tactical objectives, or paranoid fantasies. Such attackers could also be American, rather than foreign. This is critical to warning, defense, and effective response if attacks do succeed.

Once again, the very lack of an extensive history of attacks on the US homeland means the US must consider future capabilities more than current intentions, and to look beyond the most probable set of threats. It is equally important to understand that serious new threats can emerge with little warning or public agenda, and that advances in biotechnology and information warfare will probably increase threat capabilities with time.

Consideration of the Full Spectrum of Possible Types

and Methods of Attack: The Need to Consider “Worst Cases”

While the most probable forms of terrorist attack still range in lethality from low lethality modes like conventional weapons and explosives to very limited uses of chemical and biological weapons, these limits do not apply to states or their proxies. States can already launch attacks using extremely lethal modes like nuclear and biological weapons. State and proxy attacks can be launched to support covert warfare, be conducted with or without warning and attribution, and/or use more than one method of attack at the same time. In some biological attacks, the US may not even know it is under attack for days or weeks after the attack, or even be certain that it has been under attack at all.

If the US only had to consider the current threat, it might be able to concentrate on attacks using conventional weapons and explosives or limited uses of chemical and biological weapons. However, the fact the US may face threats from state actors, coupled to the ongoing changes in the technology and availability of highly lethal weapons of mass destruction, means that the US must also prepare to defend its homeland against an equally broad spectrum of possible levels and means of attack. US plans and programs must consider much higher levels of attack than those posed by ordinary terrorists, and these possible use of weapons of mass destruction to attack the US government and/or American institutions, to kill as many Americans as possible, or to broadly attack the American economy and infrastructure.

The US must consider a possible future in which the use of weapons of mass destruction becomes a common aspect of asymmetric warfare, and in which complex and sophisticated attacks are conducted against both the US and its allies. While there are few current indications that such a future will occur, it is certainly becoming technically feasible for a steadily wider range of state actors and sophisticated terrorists. America's conventional military strength, and the potential development of national missile defenses, will tend to push hostile states towards such a form of asymmetric warfare. Furthermore, if theater conflicts evolve towards such forms of asymmetric warfare, and the use of weapons of mass destruction becomes more common in theater conflicts or internal struggles outside the US, the resulting willingness to use weapons of

mass destruction could easily spillover into threats or attacks on the American homeland.

Today's "worst case" may become a future reality over the next quarter of a century. As a result, the US must not only consider scenarios involving complex and highly lethal biological attacks, and multiple use of high yield nuclear devices, but the program implications. These include (a) the value of homeland defense as a deterrent against the evolution of such a future, (b) the need to shape research and development programs to deal with the scale and nature of such attacks, and (c) the need to consider the problems such attacks create for response planning.

Making Offense, Deterrence, Denial, Defense, and Retaliation Part of Homeland Defense

The need to consider the threat posed by state actors and proxies has other implications. When the federal government views that threat of CBRN attacks largely in terms of foreign and domestic terrorism, there is a natural tendency to focus on defense and response. When the threat is broadened to include state actors, the US government must pay equal attention to the fact that the best homeland defense may often be a good offense.

Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, for example, view US policy largely in terms of what can be done within the US to prevent a terrorist act and then respond to it if defense fails. These data also seem to indicate that the threat is viewed as primarily directed at the US, rather than by theater-driven motives that may see our friends as allies as a target of equal priority. There is no sign of an effort to create a post-war concept for using offensive capabilities as a deterrent, defense, and method of retaliation, and to redefine extended deterrence.

Defense and response are not an adequate way of dealing with the CBRN threat. If attackers are foreign, federal efforts to strengthen offensive, deterrent, and retaliatory capabilities may be at least as productive as efforts to strengthen denial, defense, and response measures. Effective deterrence requires that the US be able to identify the full range of actors that threaten the US, and develop a convincing threat of immediate action to retaliate and deny attackers the ability to repeat their attacks or escalate. This, in turn, requires the US to be able to distinguish

whether states under crisis conditions are directly or indirectly involved in unconventional attacks and regardless of whether they use proxies or cover organizations.

This will not be easy in the case of well-planned attacks by states, or state-controlled or state-driven actors. Nevertheless, one key to successful defense will be the ability to clearly distinguish acts of war and who is behind them, to be able to react quickly and decisively, and convince the world such action is justified. Grim as the prospect may be, the US may have to create a convincing threat that it will respond to nuclear or biological attacks on its homeland with nuclear attacks on the population centers of any state that carries out such attacks, regardless of whether the method of attack is covert or uses proxies.

Similarly, deterrence, denial, and retaliation against attacks by independent non-state actors requires the US to be able to clearly distinguish whether states are or are not involved in such attacks; what level of action host-states can credibly be expected to take, and what level of damage the US can inflict in retaliation.

These are not game-theoretic issues. The US was not ready to take decisive action after the attack on the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon. It was ready to take military action against Libya for one series of incidents but not for the bombing of PA-103. It could not identify the target in the case of the attack on Al Khobar. It struck against targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan after the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, but with only limited effectiveness. Intelligent attackers can be expected to make every effort to avoid identification and retaliation, and to shelter behind international public opinion and civilian populations. The stakes will also be infinitely higher when the issue is nuclear and/or biological attacks on targets in the US.

The US must also recognize the fact that most foreign threats to the US that involve the use of weapons of mass destruction are likely to emerge as a result of theater-driven conflicts and confrontations rather than antagonism to the US per se. The US will be perceived as an enemy because of its support to regional friends and allies. As a result the threat posed by state actors and terrorists will generally involve the US and at least one major ally, and must be countered in the theater involved as well as the American homeland. At the same time, effective

counterterrorist, deterrent, offensive and retaliatory action – as well as effective denial, defense, and response – will have to be part of a coalition effort. The US will both have to obtain help from its allies and have some obligation to protect them.

This, indeed, is one of the critical weaknesses of both the present PDDs affecting counterterrorism and most of the federal literature on the subject. Such an approach ignores the true nature of American power and vulnerability, the assets our friends and allies can provide, and our need to develop coalition capabilities. It ignores the fact that nearly 40% of the total federal spending on counterterrorism in recent years has gone to protect US forces, embassies, and other facilities overseas. Ironically, the US has almost reversed the lessons of the Cold War, and has gone from a nearly exclusive focus on responding to the threat of WMD with deterrence through offensive retaliation to one focused largely on “civil defense.”

Linking Homeland Defense to Counterproliferation

Just as an effective homeland defense policy must be based on the use of both the offense and defense, and must be linked to US theater and coalition warfare planning, it cannot be separated from an effective counterproliferation policy:

- Like missile defense, counterproliferation deals with both a national and international threat, and one that directly involves our allies and US forces and citizens abroad.
- Although the current US policy debate is obsessed with the word “terrorist,” the threat analysis indicates that the most lethal attacks will be covert or asymmetric attacks by states, state sponsored groups, or large independent organizations capable of using weapons of mass destruction in asymmetric warfare.
- The US response cannot merely be passive in terms of interception of threats in US territory, and response measures. It must be directly linked to intelligence gathering, retaliation and deterrence, which again involve our allies and forces overseas.
- Nuclear and biological weapons represent the more important threats, even though they may not be as likely as attacks using chemical weapons or toxins. The US can deal with attacks involving weapons of mass destruction where the level of casualties is so low that they cannot be distinguished from the effects of attacks using conventional weapons. Tragic as such attacks may be, state and local resources can cope. They cannot cope with attacks involving effective nuclear or biological

weapons.

- There is no practical prospect of limiting conventional attacks through efforts to influence potential suppliers. Control regimes like Nunn-Lugar and the CWC may well, however, be one of the most effective forms of homeland-defense.

These issues highlight one of the most complex problems the US faces in terms of both national security policy and in allocating its scarce national resources. The US must develop, fund, and implement a global counterproliferation policy of which both homeland defense and counterterrorism are essential parts. In the process, it must prepare to deal with an extremely wide range of threats with very high potential lethality, but any one of which has relatively low probability. It must develop internal defense measures against both foreign and domestic threats, and it must develop response measures. Any one set of steps involves high costs to deal with threats that individually have low probability.

This presents major problems for programming that go far beyond the narrow scope of the present PDDs dealing with terrorism. There are important synergies in intelligence, active and passive defense, deterrence and retaliation, and response measures. There also, however, are homeland defense means that involves expensive and unique activities that may well require trade-offs with other military capabilities if they are ever to be funded.

Threat Prioritization: Seeking to Identify Current and Future Threats

There are two further issues that the US must deal with in defining the threat: The possible nature of the attackers, and the possible means of attack. In broad terms, the US has done a good job of identifying potential attackers and the means that they might use. It does, however, need to improve its threat and risk assessments both in terms of the ways in which it analyses attackers and the ways in which they might use weapons of mass destruction.

Potential State Actors

The US is inherently vulnerable to covert foreign attack. America is an extraordinarily

open society dependent on massive volumes of foreign trade and immigration. It has nearly 100,000 miles of shoreline and 6,000 miles of borders. Some 475 million people cross the border every year and some 142 million trucks and vehicles. There are some 21.4 million major container sized cargo shipments a year, plus countless break bulk and individual shipments. The legal trade across the US borders arrives daily at some 3,700 terminals in 301 ports of entry.¹⁹

Customs searches a tiny percentage of legal shipments into the US, and much of processing is pro forma. Most air forwarding enters the US without any inspection. Containers can enter the duty free areas of US ports and remain there for 30 days before a declaration is required. Roughly eight million containers enter the US each year, and one container takes an average of five inspectors three hours to search. In practice, one container enters Southern California every 20 seconds and almost none are searched. Some 7,000 trucks went from Windsor, Canada to Detroit in one day in February 2000, and one truck has to be cleared through Customs every 12 seconds in Detroit. The volume of illegal traffic is massive and includes an estimated 376 metric tons of cocaine a year. It also, however, includes an equally massive amount of other goods, including some 5-10 million pounds of chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) Cargo threat amounts to some \$10 billion worth of goods a year, most of which involves shipments whose nature and character cannot be proven.²⁰

As for immigration, even if one ignore legal immigrants and the constant movement of US citizens across our borders, there are some 5 million illegal immigrants in the US, roughly 2.7 of which are undocumented.²¹

State actors are one of the major potential sources of foreign attack, particularly of attacks using sophisticated CBRN weapons. US officials have identified seven states that now pose a possible threat in using weapons of mass destruction in unconventional or covert attacks against the US. These states include major powers like Russia and China, which do not seem pose an immediate threat to the US, but which have such broad ranging capabilities to manufacture weapons of mass destruction that their capabilities cannot be ignored.

They also include five more hostile powers that have some potential capability to use

weapons of mass destruction to attack the US homeland. The US Secretary of State has designated seven states as sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Six of these states -- Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, the Sudan and Syria – have access to weapons of mass destruction. Only one – North Korea – now presents more than a marginal risk that it has nuclear weapons, but all of these powers will probably acquire the capability to produce a highly lethal biological weapon over the next five to ten years.

A Department of State Assessment of State Threats

The most recent State Department reporting on terrorism, which was issued in April 2000, summarizes the threat from foreign states as follows:²²

Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan remain the seven governments that the US Secretary of State has designated as state sponsors of international terrorism. Iran continued to support numerous terrorist groups—including the Lebanese Hizbollah, HAMAS, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—in their efforts to undermine the Middle East peace process through terrorism. Although there were signs of political change in Iran in 1999, the actions of certain state institutions in support of terrorist groups made Iran the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Iraq continued to provide safehaven and support to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, as well as bases, weapons, and protection to the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian regime. Syria continued to provide safehaven and support to several terrorist groups, some of which oppose the Middle East peace process. Libya had yet to fully comply with the requirements of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions related to the trial of those accused of downing Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. North Korea harbored several hijackers of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in the 1970s and maintained links to Usama Bin Ladin and his network. Cuba continued providing safehaven to several terrorists and US fugitives and maintained ties to other state sponsors and Latin American insurgents. Finally, Sudan continued to serve as a meeting place, safehaven, and training hub for members of Bin Ladin's al-Qaida, Lebanese Hizbollah, al-Jihad, al-Gama'at, PIJ, HAMAS, and the Abu Nidal organization (ANO).

State sponsorship has decreased over the past several decades. As it decreases, it becomes increasingly important for all countries to adopt a “zero tolerance” for terrorist activity within their borders. Terrorists will seek safehaven in those areas where they are able to avoid the rule of law and to travel, prepare, raise funds, and operate. In 1999 the United States actively researched and gathered intelligence on other states that will be considered for designation as state sponsors.

The State Department report describes the level of support for terrorism in each state as follows:²³

- **Cuba:**

Cuba continued to provide safehaven to several terrorists and U.S. fugitives in 1999. A number of Basque ETA terrorists who gained sanctuary in Cuba some years ago continued to live on the island, as did several U.S. terrorist fugitives.

Havana also maintained ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and Latin American insurgents. Colombia's two largest terrorist organizations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (ELN), both maintained a permanent presence on the island. In late 1999, Cuba hosted a series of meetings between Colombian Government officials and ELN leaders.

- **Iran:**

Although there were signs of political change in Iran in 1999, the actions of certain state institutions in support of terrorist groups made Iran the most active state sponsor of terrorism. These state institutions, notably the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, continued to be involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts and continued to support a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.

A variety of public reports indicate Iran's security forces conducted several bombings against Iranian dissidents abroad. Iranian agents, for example, were blamed for a truck bombing in early October of a Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) terrorist base near Basrah, Iraq, that killed several MEK members and non-MEK individuals.

Iran continued encouraging Hizbollah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups—including HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC—to use violence, especially terrorist attacks, in Israel to undermine the peace process. Iran supported these groups with varying amounts of money, training, and weapons. Despite statements by the Khatami administration that Iran was not working against the peace process, Tehran stepped up its encouragement of, and support for, these groups after the election of Israeli Prime Minister Barak and the resumption of Israel-Syria peace talks. In a gesture of public support, President Khatami met with Damascus-based Palestinian rejectionist leaders during his visit to Syria in May. In addition, Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei reflected Iran's covert actions aimed at scuttling the peace process when he sponsored a major rally in Tehran on 9 November to demonstrate Iran's opposition to Israel and peace. Hizbollah and Palestinian rejectionist speakers at the rally reaffirmed their support for violent *jihād* against Israel. A Palestinian Islamic Jihad representative praised a bombing in Netanya that occurred days before and promised more such attacks.

Tehran still provided safehaven to elements of Turkey's separatist PKK that conducted numerous terrorist attacks in Turkey and against Turkish targets in Europe. One of the PKK's most senior at-large leaders, Osman Ocalan, brother of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, resided at least part-time in Iran. Iran also provided support to terrorist groups in North Africa and South and Central Asia, including financial assistance and training.

Tehran accurately claimed that it also was a victim of terrorism, as the opposition Mujahedin-e Khalq conducted several terrorist attacks in Iran. On 10 April the group assassinated Brigadier General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, the Iranian Armed Forces Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff.

- **Iraq:**

Iraq continued to plan and sponsor international terrorism in 1999. Although Baghdad focused primarily on the antiregime opposition both at home and abroad, it continued to provide safehaven and support to various terrorist groups.

Press reports stated that, according to a defecting Iraqi intelligence agent, the Iraqi intelligence service had planned to bomb the offices of Radio Free Europe in Prague. Radio Free Europe offices include Radio Liberty, which began broadcasting news and information to Iraq in October 1998. The plot was foiled when it became public in early 1999.

The Iraqi opposition publicly stated its fears that the Baghdad regime was planning to assassinate those

opposed to Saddam Hussein. A spokesman for the Iraqi National Accord in November said that the movement's security organs had obtained information about a plan to assassinate its secretary general, Dr. Iyad 'Allawi, and a member of the movement's political bureau, as well as another Iraqi opposition leader.

Iraq continued to provide safehaven to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, including the Abu Nidal organization, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and the former head of the now-defunct 15 May Organization, Abu Ibrahim, who masterminded several bombings of U.S. aircraft.

Iraq provided bases, weapons, and protection to the MEK, an Iranian terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian regime. In 1999, MEK cadre based in Iraq assassinated or attempted to assassinate several high-ranking Iranian Government officials, including Brigadier General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, Deputy Chief of Iran's Joint Staff, who was killed in Tehran on 10 April.

- **Libya:**

In April 1999, Libya took an important step by surrendering for trial the two Libyans accused of bombing Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. The move responded directly to the US-UK initiative; concerted efforts by the Saudi, Egyptian, and South African Governments; and the active engagement of the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General. At yearend, however, Libya still had not complied with the remaining UN Security Council requirements: payment of appropriate compensation; acceptance of responsibility for the actions of its officials; renunciation of, and an end to, support for terrorism; and cooperation with the prosecution and trial. Libyan leader Qadhafi repeatedly stated publicly during the year that his government had adopted an antiterrorism stance, but it remained unclear whether his claims of distancing Libya from its terrorist past signified a true change in policy.

Libya also remained the primary suspect in several other past terrorist operations, including the La Belle discotheque bombing in Berlin in 1986 that killed two US servicemen and one Turkish civilian and wounded more than 200 persons. The trial in Germany of five suspects in the bombing, which began in November 1997, continued in 1999.

In 1999, Libya expelled the Abu Nidal organization and distanced itself from the Palestinian rejectionists, announcing that the Palestinian Authority was the only legitimate address for Palestinian concerns. Libya still may have retained ties to some Palestinian groups that use violence to oppose the Middle East peace process, however, including the PIJ and the PFLP-GC.

- **North Korea:**

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) continued to provide safehaven to the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction members who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970. P'yongyang allowed members of the Japanese Diet to visit some of the hijackers during the year. In 1999 the D.P.R.K. also attempted to kidnap in Thailand a North Korean diplomat who had defected the day before. The attempt led the North Korean Embassy to hold the former diplomat's son hostage for two weeks. Some evidence also suggests the D.P.R.K. in 1999 may have sold weapons directly or indirectly to terrorist groups.

- **Pakistan**

In 1999 the United States increasingly was concerned about reports of Pakistani support for terrorist groups and elements active in Kashmir, as well as Pakistani relations with the Taliban, which continued to harbor terrorists such as Usama Bin Ladin. In the Middle East, the United States was concerned that a variety of terrorist groups operated and trained inside Lebanon with relative impunity. Lebanon also was unresponsive to U.S. requests to bring to justice terrorists who attacked U.S. citizens and property in

Lebanon in previous years.

- **Sudan**

Sudan in 1999 continued to serve as a central hub for several international terrorist groups, including Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaida organization. The Sudanese Government also condoned Iran's assistance to terrorist and radical Islamist groups operating in and transiting through Sudan.

Khartoum served as a meeting place, safehaven, and training hub for members of the Lebanese Hizbollah, Egyptian Gama'at al-Islamiyya, al-Jihad, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and Abu Nidal organization. Sudan's support to these groups included the provision of travel documentation, safe passage, and refuge. Most of the groups maintained offices and other forms of representation in the capital, using Sudan primarily as a secure base for organizing terrorist operations and assisting compatriots elsewhere.

Sudan still had not complied with UN Security Council Resolutions 1044, 1054, and 1070 passed in 1996--which demand that Sudan end all support to terrorists--despite the regime's efforts to distance itself publicly from terrorism. They also require Khartoum to hand over three Egyptian Gama'at fugitives linked to the assassination attempt in 1995 against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia. Sudanese officials continued to deny that they are harboring the three suspects and that they had a role in the attack.

- **Syria:** (1998 Report) There is no evidence that Syrian officials have engaged directly in planning or executing international terrorist attacks since 1986. Syria, nonetheless, continues to provide safehaven and support to several terrorist groups, allowing some to maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory. Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, for example, have their headquarters in Damascus. In addition, Syria grants a wide variety of terrorist groups--including HAMAS, the PFLP-GC, and the PIJ--basing privileges or refuge in areas of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley under Syrian control.

Although Damascus claims to be committed to the Middle East peace process, it has not acted to stop anti-Israeli attacks by Hizbollah and Palestinian rejectionist groups in southern Lebanon. Syria allowed--but did not participate in--a meeting of Palestinian rejectionist groups in Damascus in December to reaffirm their public opposition to the peace process. Syria also assists the resupply of rejectionist groups operating in Lebanon via Damascus. Nonetheless, the Syrian Government continues to restrain the international activities of some groups and to participate in a multinational monitoring group to prevent attacks against civilian targets in southern Lebanon and northern Israel.

The June 2000 report of the National Commission on Terrorism added Afghanistan and Greece to the list states that the State Department designates as terrorism sponsors or "not cooperating fully":²⁴

The U.S. Government has not designated Afghanistan as a state sponsor of terrorism because it does not recognize the Taliban regime as the Government of Afghanistan.

In 1996, the Taliban regime gained control of the capital of Afghanistan and began asserting its control over much of the country. Since then it has provided a safehaven to terrorist groups and terrorist fugitives wanted by U.S. law enforcement, including Usama bin Ladin-- who is under indictment for his role in the bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The Taliban also supports the training camps of many of these terrorist groups.

...In 1996, Congress enacted a law that authorizes the President to designate as "not cooperating fully"

states whose behavior is objectionable but not so egregious as to warrant designation as a "state sponsor of terrorism." This law has not been effectively used.

Some countries use the rhetoric of counterterrorist cooperation but are unwilling to shoulder their responsibilities in practice, such as restricting the travel of terrorists through their territory or ratifying United Nations conventions on terrorism. Other states have relations with terrorists that fall short of the extensive criteria for designation as a state sponsor, but their failure to act against terrorists perpetuates terrorist activities. Newer terrorist groups, many of which are transnational in composition and less influenced by state agendas, can take advantage of such states for safehaven.

To address these categories of countries, in 1996 Congress authorized the President to designate countries as "not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts" and to embargo defense sales to such states. To date, only Afghanistan has been so designated, and that designation arose from the legal difficulty of putting Afghanistan on the state sponsor list without appearing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government.

Two other countries that present difficulties for U.S. counterterrorism policy are Pakistan and Greece. Both are friendly nations and Greece is a NATO ally.

...Greece has been disturbingly passive in response to terrorist activities. It is identified by the U.S. Government as "one of the weakest links in Europe's effort against terrorism" (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999. U.S. Department of State.) Since 1975 there have been 146 terrorist attacks against Americans or American interests in Greece. Only one case has been solved and there is no indication of any meaningful investigation into the remaining cases. Among the unresolved cases are the attacks by the Revolutionary Organization 17 November which has claimed responsibility for the deaths of 20 people, including four Americans, since 1975. Greek authorities have never arrested a member of 17 November, which is a designated FTO. The Turkish leftist group, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C), also an FTO, has murdered four Americans since 1979 and maintains an office in Athens despite United States protests. Last year, senior Greek Government officials gave assistance and refuge to the leader of the Kurdish terrorist group, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).

A Department of Defense Assessment of Threats from Foreign States

There is a rough correlation between the states the US has identified as potential threats and the states capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. A recent Department of Defense report on chemical and biological weapons summaries the developments in several key states as follows:²⁵

- **China**

China possesses an advanced biotechnology infrastructure as well as the requisite munitions production capabilities necessary to develop, produce and weaponize biological agents. Although China has consistently claimed that it has never researched or produced biological weapons, it is nonetheless believed likely that it retains a biological warfare capability begun before acceding to the BWC.

China is believed to have an advanced chemical warfare program that includes research and development, production and weaponization capabilities. Its current inventory is believed to include the full range of traditional chemical agents. It also has a wide variety of delivery systems for chemical agents to include artillery rockets, aerial bombs, sprayers, and short-range ballistic missiles. Chinese forces, like those of

North Korea, have conducted defensive CW training and are prepared to operate in a contaminated environment. As China's program is further integrated into overall military operations, its doctrine, which is believed to be based in part on Soviet-era thinking, may reflect the incorporation of more advanced munitions for CW agent delivery. China has signed and ratified the CWC.

- **Libya**

Libya's biological warfare program is believed to remain in the early research and development phase. Progress has been slow due in part to an inadequate scientific and technical base. Though Libya may be able to produce small quantities of usable agent, it is unlikely to transition from laboratory work to production of militarily significant quantities until well after the year 2000. Libya acceded to the BWC in 1982.

Libya has experienced major setbacks to its chemical warfare program, first as a result of intense public scrutiny focused on its Rabta facility in the late 1980s and more recently on its Tarhuna underground facility. Nevertheless, Libya retains a small inventory of chemical weapons as well as a CW agent production capability. Prior to closing its Rabta plant in 1990, Libya succeeded in producing up to 100 tons of blister and nerve agent at the site. Although the site was re-opened in 1995, ostensibly as a pharmaceutical plant, the facility is still believed capable of producing CW agents. CW-related activities at the Tarhuna site are believed to be suspended. Libya has not ratified the CWC and is not likely to do so in the near future.

- **India**

India has a well-developed biotechnology infrastructure that includes numerous pharmaceutical production facilities bio-containment laboratories (including BL-3) for working with lethal pathogens. It also has qualified scientists with expertise in infectious diseases. Some of India's facilities are being used to support research and development for BW defense purposes. These facilities constitute a substantial capability for offensive purposes as well. India is a signatory to the BWC of 1972.

India also has an advanced commercial chemical industry, and produces the bulk of its own chemicals for domestic consumption. New Delhi ratified the CWC in 1996. In its required declarations, it acknowledged the existence of a chemical warfare program. New Delhi has pledged that all facilities related to its CW program would be open for inspection. Pakistan has a capable but less well-developed biotechnology infrastructure than India. Its facilities, while fewer in number, could nonetheless support work on lethal biological pathogens. Moreover, Pakistan is believed to have the resources and capabilities necessary to support a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort. Like India, Pakistan is a signatory to the BWC.

- **Iran**

Iran's biological warfare program, which began during the Iran-Iraq war, is now believed to generally be in the advanced research and development phase. Iran has qualified, highly trained scientists and considerable expertise with pharmaceuticals. It also possesses the commercial and military infrastructure needed to produce basic biological warfare agents and may have produced pilot quantities of usable agent. Iran is a signatory to the BWC of 1972.

Iran initiated a chemical weapons program in the early stages of the Iran-Iraq war after it was attacked with chemical weapons. The program has received heightened attention since the early 1990s with an expansion in both the chemical production infrastructure as well as its munitions arsenal. Iran currently possesses munitions containing blister, blood, and choking agents and may have nerve agents as well. It has the capability to deliver CW agents using artillery shells and aerial bombs. Iran has ratified the CWC, declared

agents and chemical agent production facilities, and is obligated to open suspected sites to international inspection and eliminate its CW program.

- **Iraq**

Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq developed the largest and most advanced biological warfare program in the Middle East. Though a variety of agents were studied, Iraq declared anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin to have completed the weaponization cycle. During the Gulf War, coalition bombing destroyed or damaged many key facilities associated with BW activity. However, it is suspected that a key portion of Iraq's BW capability, in the form of agent-filled munitions, was hidden and may have subsequently escaped damage. Nonetheless, Iraq declared, after the war, that all BW agent stockpile and munitions were unilaterally destroyed. United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) activity has, however, revealed this assertion as well as many others related to BW activity, to be inaccurate and misleading. As with its chemical program, Iraq intends to re-establish its BW capabilities if afforded the opportunity by the relaxation or cessation of UNSCOM inspection activity.

Iraq had a mature chemical weapons program prior to the Gulf War that included a variety of nerve agents, such as tabun (GA), Sarin (GB), and GF, as well as the blister agent mustard, available for offensive use. Iraq also undertook a program, begun in 1985 and continuing uninterrupted until December 1990, to produce the advanced nerve agent VX. Recent UNSCOM findings indicate that Iraq had weaponized VX in Al Hussein missile warheads. Although Iraq's chemical warfare program suffered extensive damage during the Gulf War and subsequently from UNSCOM activity, Iraq retains a limited capability to re-constitute key parts of its chemical warfare program. Moreover, UNSCOM, despite having destroyed over 700 metric tons of agent, is still unable to verify elements of Iraqi declarations such as the disposal of chemical precursors, as well as the destruction of all chemical munitions. The comprehensive nature of Iraq's previous chemical warfare activity and the consistent pattern of denial and deception employed by Iraqi authorities indicate a high-level intent to rebuild this capacity, should Iraq be given the opportunity.

- **North Korea**

North Korea has been pursuing research and development related to biological warfare since the 1960s. Pyongyang's resources presently include a rudimentary (by Western standards) biotechnology infrastructure that is sufficient to support the production of limited quantities of toxins, as well as viral and bacterial biological warfare agents. In the early 1990s, an open press release by a foreign government referred to applied military biotechnology work at numerous North Korean medical institutes and universities dealing with pathogens such as anthrax, cholera, and plague. North Korea possesses a sufficient munitions-production infrastructure to accomplish weaponization of BW agents. North Korea acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1987.

By comparison, North Korea's chemical warfare program is believed to be mature and includes the capability, since 1989, to indigenously produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood chemical agents as well as a variety of different filled munitions systems. North Korea is believed to possess a sizable stockpile of chemical weapons, which could be employed in offensive military operations against the South. North Korea has also devoted considerable scarce resources to defensive measures aimed at protecting its civilian population and military forces from the effects of chemical weapons. Such measures include extensive training in the use of protective masks, suits, detectors, and decontamination systems. Though these measures are ostensibly focused on a perceived threat from U.S. and South Korean forces, they could also support the offensive use of chemical weapons by the North during combat. North Korea has yet to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and is not expected to do so in the near-term, due to intrusive inspection and verification requirements mandated by the agreement.

- **Pakistan**

Pakistan has a less-well developed commercial chemical industry but is expected to eventually have the

capability to produce all precursor chemicals needed to support a chemical weapons stockpile. Like India, Pakistan has numerous munitions systems which could be used to deliver CW agent, including artillery, aerial bombs, and missiles. Pakistan has ratified the CWC, but submitted a null declaration.

- **The former Soviet Union's**

The FSU's offensive biological warfare program was the world's largest and consisted of both military facilities and nonmilitary research and development institutes. Non-military activity was centrally coordinated and performed largely through a consortium of institutes known as Biopreparat. This network of facilities was created in 1973 as a cover for activity related to biological warfare. This huge organization at one time employed up to 25,000 people and involved nearly 20 research, development and production facilities. The Russian government has committed to ending the former Soviet BW program, although serious questions about offensive BW capabilities remain. Key components of the former program remain largely intact and may support a possible future mobilization capability for the production of biological warfare agents and delivery systems. Moreover, work outside the scope of legitimate biological defense activity may be occurring at selected facilities within Russia. Such activity, if offensive in nature, would contradict statements by top Russian political leaders that offensive activity has ceased.

While former Soviet biological warfare facilities existed in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, none are currently active. Moreover, the governments in these new republics are not believed to have plans to establish any future BW capability. Also, Belarus has no program and no intention of establishing one. Ukraine, Belarus, and Uzbekistan have ratified the BWC, while Kazakhstan has not yet signed it.

Russia has acknowledged the world's largest stockpile of chemical agents, amounting to approximately 40,000 metric tons. This stockpile, consisting mostly of weaponized agent includes artillery, aerial bombs, rockets, and missile warheads. Actual agents include a variety of nerve and blister agents. Additionally, some Russian chemical weapons incorporate agent mixtures, while others have added thickening materials in order to increase agent persistence. Russian officials do not deny that CW research has continued but claim that it is for defensive purposes and therefore not proscribed by the CWC. Many of the components for new binary agents developed under the former-Soviet program have legitimate civilian applications and are not considered on the CWC's schedule of chemicals.

- **Syria**

Syria has a limited biotechnology infrastructure but could support a limited biological warfare effort. Though Syria is believed to be pursuing the development of biological weapons, it is not believed to have progressed much beyond the research and development phase and may have produced only pilot quantities of usable agent. Syria has signed, but not ratified, the BWC. Syria has a mature chemical weapons program, begun in the 1970s, incorporating nerve agents, such as Sarin, which have completed the weaponization cycle. Future activity will likely focus on CW infrastructure enhancements for agent production and storage, as well as possible research and development of advanced nerve agents. Munitions available for CW agent delivery likely include aerial bombs as well as SCUD missile warheads. Syria has not signed the CWC and is unlikely to do so in the near future.

The Probable Lack of Well-Defined Strategic Warning of a Threat from State Actors and Unpredictable Behavior in a Crisis

None of the State Department and Department of Defense descriptions of hostile and proliferating states imply that any of the states listed above are now likely to take the risk of

attacking the US. They do, however, have dangerous capabilities, and US policy cannot, however, be based on current threats. A covert or proxy attack by Iran would have seemed much more likely during the tanker war of 1987-1988, and an Iran willing to build missiles with ranges capable of reaching the US may well have contingency plans for other forms of attack. If the Gulf War had not taken place, Iraq would pose a much greater threat, and if sanctions are lifted, it may develop such attack capabilities in an effort to either deter US action in the Gulf or punish it for any attack on the Iraqi leadership. North Korea remains unpredictable. The behavior of any regime can change suddenly in a crisis. For example, the US never had to seriously evaluate Serbian chemical warfare capabilities before its intervention in Kosovo.

There also is no reason to assume the US can now identify its future attackers. Attacks by state actors may well come from one of the roughly 170 states that are not a threat today. New proliferators continue to emerge and states can develop biological and chemical weapons with little or no warning. The transfer of fissile material from state to state could sharply reduce the lead times in nuclear proliferation, and today's "friend" or "neutral" could easily become tomorrow's enemy.

Table Three shows that list of today's known proliferators is also considerably longer than the list of today's known threats. It is uncertain how much strategic warning the US will have of the fact that a proliferating state might take hostile action. Under normal conditions, it seems likely that virtually any state actor would show great restraint in attacking the US homeland because of the risks of retaliation. As a result, it seems more likely that a non-state actor would take such risks than a state. "Normal," however, is an uncertain term.

There are several interactive reasons why the US might not receive adequate strategic warning and/or "normal" behavior might not restrain a state:

- Crisis behavior is very different from normal behavior. For example, the ability to threaten or attack the US might be exercised if a regime felt that it was fatally threatened by US military action or a US supported coalition, or that an attack on the US might force the US or international community to take action that would aid it in a conflict. Iraq's horizontal escalation in using missiles against Israel is an example of such crisis behavior.

- The lead times and indicators that identify proliferating states are changing with time. The spread of chemical, biological, and associated delivery system technologies is proliferating throughout much of the developing world, as is the ability to use fissile material in a nuclear weapon. The US can have steadily less confidence in the time it has in which to detect proliferation, and in the material indications that proliferation is taking place.
- The US has not established a clear doctrine of massive retaliation in reprisal for such attacks, and the threat the US might reply with massive conventional attacks or by using nuclear weapons may become steadily less convincing with time.
- A hostile state actor might attempt to conceal an attack in several ways that would offer a reasonable chance that it would not be detected or that it could avoid massive retaliation:
 - It could build-up or support an independent extremist or terrorist movement and use it as a proxy, as Syria and Iran have used the Hizbollah and Hamas. In many cases, such movements have several state supporters, and the particular state using a proxy to attack the US might not be possible to identify. The ambiguities surrounding the attack on the USAF compound at Al Khobar is a case in point.
 - A hostile state might use a crisis or conflict involving another state hostile to the US as a cover for its attack. In the case of Iran or Iraq, for example, attacking the US homeland during a crisis with the other state might succeed in both hiding the true nature of the attacker and causing the US to retaliate against a regional enemy.
 - Biological attacks with long lead times before there affects become apparent may be very difficult to characterize. Attacks on animals and agriculture could be extremely costly to the US, but would be difficult to characterize, and the US has no apparent retaliatory doctrine for dealing with such attacks.
 - A hostile state might piggyback on a more conventional form of covert attack by another state, or a separate attack by a hostile terrorist or extremist movement.

These uncertainties *do not* mean that state driven-covert attacks on the US homeland are likely, with or without the use of weapons of mass destruction. They do mean that it is dangerous to attempt to assign a relative probability based on current, pre-crisis, or peacetime behavior.

Table Three

Global Challenges: Who Has Weapons of Mass Destruction?

<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Weapon of Mass Destruction</u>			<u>Long-Range Missiles</u>	
	<u>Chemical</u>	<u>Biological</u>	<u>Nuclear</u>	<u>Theater</u>	<u>Intercontinental</u>
<u>East-West</u>					
Britain	Breakout	Breakout	Deployed	Deployed	SLBMs
Canada	-	Technology	Technology	-	-
France	Breakout	Breakout	Deployed	Deployed	SLBMs
Germany	Breakout	Breakout	Technology	Technology	-
Serbia	Deployed	-	-	Deployed	-
Sweden	-	-	Technology	-	-
Russia	Residual	Residual	Deployed	Technology	ICBMS/SLBMs
US	Residual	Breakout	Deployed	Technology	ICBMS/SLBMs
<u>Middle East</u>					
Egypt	Residual	Breakout	-	Deployed	-
Israel	Breakout	Breakout	Deployed	Deployed	-
Iran	Technology/Booster	Deployed?	Breakout	Technology	Deployed
			Technology/Booster		
Iraq	Deployed	Deployed	Technology	Technology	?
Libya	Deployed	Research	-	Deployed	?
Syria	Deployed	Technology?	-	Deployed	-
Yemen	Residual	-	-	-	-
<u>Asia and South Asia</u>					
China	Deployed?	Breakout?	Deployed	Deployed	ICBMS/SLBMs
India	Breakout?	Breakout?	Deployed	Deployed	Technology
Japan	Breakout	Breakout	Technology	Technology	-
Pakistan	Breakout?	Breakout?	Deployed	Deployed	Technology?
North Korea	Deployed	Deployed	Technology	Deployed	
	Technology/Booster				
South Korea	Breakout?	Breakout	Technology	Technology?	-
Taiwan	Breakout?	Breakout	Technology	-	-
Thailand	Residual	-	-	-	-
Vietnam	Residual	-	-	-	-
<u>Other</u>					
Argentina	-	-	Technology	Technology	-
Brazil	-	-	Technology	Technology	-
South Africa	-	-	Technology	Technology	-

Foreign Terrorists and Extremists

Tables One and Two have already shown that terrorist and extremist violence comes in uncertain cycles. The most recent data on the actions of foreign terrorists and extremists confirms this pattern. The US State Department reports that there were 304 international terrorist attacks during 1997, 273 attacks during 1998, and 387 during 1999. Taken at face value, 1998 seems a low year for terrorism. In fact, it had the fewest annual incidents since 1971 and only 70% of the incidents in 1999. The total number of persons killed or wounded in terrorist attacks, however, was the highest on record: 741 persons died, and 5,952 persons suffered injuries. Twelve US citizens died in terrorist attacks in 1998, all in the Nairobi bombing. Each was an Embassy employee or dependent. Eleven other US citizens were wounded in terrorist attacks last year, including six in Nairobi and one in Dar es Salaam. Three-fifths of the total attacks – 166 – were bombings. The foremost type of target was business related.²⁶

There are no similar patterns to look at in terms of foreign terrorist and extremist attacks on the US. The State Department does not report any successful foreign terrorist attacks on the American homeland since the World Trade Center bombing attacks in 1993. However, the US was the target of the devastating bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in August 1999. In Nairobi, the US Embassy was located in a congested downtown area, and 213 persons were killed in the attack, and about 4,500 were wounded. In Dar es Salaam, 10 persons were killed and 77 were wounded.

More broadly, about 40 percent of all the attacks the US State Department reported in 1998 – a total of 111 – were directed against US targets. However, the majority of these attacks – a total of 77 – were bombings of a single target – the multinational oil pipeline in Colombia, which terrorists regard as a US target.

Continuing Threats and Counterterrorist Action

The failure to attack the US homeland has also does not reflect a lack of potential threats. The Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, summarized the threat posed by foreign terrorists as

follows in testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies on February 4, 1999.²⁷

The current international terrorist threat can be divided into three general categories that represent a serious and distinct threat to the United States. These categories also reflect, to a large degree, how terrorists have adapted their tactics since the 1970's by learning from past successes and failures, from becoming familiar with law enforcement capabilities and tactics, and from exploiting technologies and weapons that are increasingly available to them in the post-Cold War era.

The first threat category, state sponsors of terrorism, violates every convention of international law. State sponsors of terrorism currently designated by the Department of State are: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. Put simply, these nations view terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. In recent years, the terrorist activities of Cuba and North Korea appear to have declined as the economies of these countries have deteriorated. However, the terrorist activities of the other states I mentioned continue, and in some cases, have intensified during the past several years.

The second category of the international terrorist threat is represented by more formal terrorist organizations. These autonomous, generally transnational, organizations have their own infrastructures, personnel, financial arrangements, and training facilities. These organizations are able to plan and mount terrorist campaigns on an international basis and actively support terrorist activities in the United States.

Extremist groups such as Lebanese Hizbollah, the Egyptian Al-Gama' Al-Islamiyya, and the Palestinian Hamas have supporters in the United States who could be used to support an act of terrorism here. Hizbollah ranks among the most menacing of these groups. It has staged many anti-American attacks in other countries, such as the 1983 truck bombings of the United States Embassy and the United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, the 1984 bombing of the United States Embassy Annex in Beirut, and the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 during which United States Navy diver Robert Stehem, a passenger on the flight, was murdered by the hijackers. Elements of Hizbollah were also responsible for the kidnapping and detention of United States hostages in Lebanon throughout the 1980's.

The activities of American cells of Hizbollah, Hamas, and Al Gama' Al Islamiyya generally revolve around fund-raising and low-level intelligence gathering. In addition, there are still significant numbers of Iranian students attending United States universities and technical institutions. A significant number of these students are hardcore members of the pro-Iranian student organization known as the Anjoman Islamie, which is comprised almost exclusively of fanatical, anti-American, Iranian Shiite Muslims. The Iranian Government relies heavily upon these students studying in the United States for low-level intelligence and technical expertise. However, the Anjoman Islamie also represents a significant resource base upon which the government of Iran can draw to maintain the capability to mount operations against the United States, if it so decides.

The third category of international terrorist threat stems from loosely affiliated extremists, characterized by rogue terrorists such as Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and international terrorist financier Usama bin Laden. These loosely affiliated extremists may pose the most urgent threat to the United States because these individuals bring together groups on an ad hoc, temporary basis. By not being encumbered with the demands associated with maintaining a rigid, organizational infrastructure, these individuals are more difficult for law enforcement to track and infiltrate. Individuals such as Ramzi Yousef and Usama bin Laden have also demonstrated an ability to exploit mobility and technology to avoid detection and to conduct terrorist acts. Fortunately, in 1995, we were able to capture Yousef and return him to the United States to stand trial for the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the conspiracy to attack American aircraft overseas. Yousef was convicted in two trials and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The FBI believes that the threat posed by international terrorists in each of these categories will continue for the foreseeable future. As attention remains focused on Usama bin Laden in the aftermath of the East

African bombings, I believe it is important to remember that rogue terrorists such as bin Laden represent just one type of threat that the United States faces. It is imperative that we maintain our capabilities to counter the broad range of international terrorist threats that confront the United States.

For many of us in this room, the threat of international terrorism was literally brought home by the World Trade Center bombing in February 1993. Although the plotters failed in their attempt to topple one of the twin towers into the other, an outcome that would have produced thousands of casualties, they succeeded in causing millions of dollars worth of damage in a blast that killed 6 persons and injured more than 1,000. After his capture in 1995, Ramzi Yousef, the convicted mastermind behind the New York City bombing and other terrorist acts, conceded to investigators that a lack of funding forced his group's hand in plotting the destruction of the World Trade Center. Running short of money, the plotters could not assemble a bomb as large as they had originally intended. The timing of the attack was also rushed by a lack of finances. Incredibly, the plotters' desire to recoup the deposit fee on the rental truck used to transport the bomb helped lead investigators to them. As horrible as that act was, it could very well have been much more devastating.

We are fortunate that in the nearly six years since the World Trade Center bombing, no significant act of foreign-directed terrorism has occurred on American soil. At the same time, however, we have witnessed a pattern of terrorist attacks that are either directed at United States interests or initiated in response to United States Government policies and actions. Among these acts are:

...As these examples illustrate, the threat of terrorism is real both at home and abroad. Usama bin Laden readily acknowledges trying to obtain chemical and biological weapons for use in his jihad, or holy war, against the United States. We also know that domestic terrorist groups have also expressed interest in chemical and biological agents. The willingness of terrorists to carry out more large-scale incidents designed for maximum destruction places a larger proportion of our population at risk. Today, Americans engaged in activities as routine as working in an office building, commuting to and from work, or visiting museums and historical sites in foreign lands, can become random victims in a deadly game acted out by international terrorists. America's democratic tradition and global presence make United States citizens and interests targets for opportunists who are willing to shed the blood of innocents for their causes.

The FBI also notes that part of the reason for the low incidence of recent attacks on the US is that the US has steadily stepped up its counterterrorism efforts, and there have been a number of recent cases in which the US took action against terrorists who attacked Americans:²⁸

- On 4 November, 1998, indictments were returned before the US District Court for the Southern District of New York in connection with the two US Embassy bombings in Africa. Charged in the indictment were: Usama Bin Ladin, his military commander Muhammad Atef, and al-Qaida members Wadih El Hage, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Mohammed Sadeek Odeh, and Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali. Two of these suspects, Odeh and al-Owhali, were turned over to US authorities in Kenya and brought to the United States to stand trial. Another suspect, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, was arrested in Germany in September and extradited to the United States in December. On 16 December five others were indicted for their role in the Dar es Salaam Embassy bombing: Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Fahid Mohommed Ally Msalam, and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan. (See box on Usama Bin Ladin on page 29.)
- In June, 1998, Mohammed Rashid was turned over to US authorities overseas and brought to the United States to stand trial on charges of planting a bomb in 1982 on a Pan Am flight from Tokyo to Honolulu that detonated, killing one passenger and wounding 15 others. Rashid had served part of a prison term in Greece in connection with the bombing until that country released him from prison early and expelled him in December 1996, in a move the United States called "incomprehensible." The nine-count US indictment against Rashid charges him with murder, sabotage, bombing, and other crimes in connection with the Pan

Am explosion.

- Three additional persons convicted in the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 were sentenced last year. Eyad Mahmoud Ismail Najim, who drove the explosive-laden van into the World Trade Center, was sentenced to 240 years in prison and ordered to pay \$10 million in restitution and a \$250,000 fine. Mohammad Abouhalima, who was convicted as an accessory for driving his brother to the Kennedy International Airport knowing he had participated in the bombing, was sentenced to eight years in prison. Ibrahim Ahmad Suleiman received a 10-month sentence on two counts of perjury for lying to the grand jury investigating the bombing.
- In May 1998, Abdul Hakim Murad was sentenced to life in prison without parole for his role in the failed conspiracy in January 1995 to blow up a dozen US airliners over the Pacific Ocean. Murad received an additional 60-year sentence for his role and was fined \$250,000. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who was convicted previously in this conspiracy and for his role in the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, is serving a life prison term.

This list of arrests and thwarted attempts is scarcely evidence that a threat does not exist; it is rather evidence that it does exist and has not been successful.

Major Foreign Terrorist Groups and Extremists

There is no comprehensive list of foreign terrorist organizations, and any attempt to make such a list would run up against a host of problems in distinguishing between “freedom fighters,” non-violent opposition movements and terrorists. Many of the groups involved have major internal divisions and splinter groups and new groups keep emerging. The US State Department has, however, designated a list of key movements that it feels can be described as terrorist:²⁹

- **Abu Nidal organization (ANO)** a.k.a. Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, and Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims International terrorist organization led by Sabri al-Banna. Split from PLO in 1974. Made up of various functional committees, including political, military, and financial. Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in July 1988 in Greece. Suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. Has not attacked Western targets since the late 1980s. *Has received considerable support, including safehaven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations.*
- **Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)** Smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991 under the leadership of Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998. Some members have studied or worked in the Middle East and developed ties to Arab *mujahidin* while fighting and training in Afghanistan. Uses bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion payments to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern

Philippines heavily populated by Muslims. Raided the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995, the group's first large-scale action. Suspected of several small-scale bombings and kidnappings in 1998. *Probably receives support from Islamic extremists in the Middle East and South Asia.*

- **Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)** The ABB, the urban hit squad of the Communist Party of the Philippines, was formed in the mid-1980s. Responsible for more than 100 murders and believed to have been involved in the 1989 murder of US Army Col. James Rowe in the Philippines. Although reportedly decimated by a series of arrests in late 1995, the murder in June 1996 of a former high-ranking Philippine official, claimed by the group, demonstrates that it still maintains terrorist capabilities. In March 1997 the group announced that it had formed an alliance with another armed group, the Revolutionary Proletarian Army.
- **Armed Islamic Group (GIA)*** An Islamic extremist group, the GIA aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The GIA began its violent activities in early 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)--the largest Islamic party--in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991. Frequent attacks against civilians, journalists, and foreign residents. In the last several years the GIA has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operations and frequently killing hundreds of civilians. Since announcing its terrorist campaign against foreigners living in Algeria in September 1993, the GIA has killed more than 100 expatriate men and women--mostly Europeans--in the country. Uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. The GIA hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers in December 1994, and suspicions centered on the group for a series of bombings in France in 1995. *Algerian expatriates and GIA members abroad, many of whom reside in Western Europe, provide some financial and logistic support. In addition, the Algerian Government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists and severed diplomatic relations with Iran in March 1993.*
- **Aum Supreme Truth (Aum)*** a.k.a. Aum Shinrikyo A cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, Aum aims to take over Japan and then the world. Its organizational structure mimicks that of a nation-state, with "finance," "construction," and "science and technology" ministries. Approved as a religious entity in 1989 under Japanese law, the group ran candidates in a Japanese parliamentary election in 1990. Over time, the cult began to emphasize the imminence of the end of the world and stated that the United States would initiate "Armageddon" by starting World War III with Japan. The Japanese Government revoked its recognition of Aum as a religious organization in October 1995, but in 1997 a government panel decided not to invoke the Anti-Subversive Law against the group, which would have outlawed the cult. On 20 March 1995 Aum members simultaneously released Sarin nerve gas on several Tokyo subway trains, killing 12 persons and injuring up to 6,000. The group was responsible for other mysterious chemical incidents in Japan in 1994. Its efforts to conduct attacks using biological agents have been unsuccessful. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 1995, and he remained on trial facing seventeen counts of murder at the end of 1998. In 1997 and 1998 the cult resumed its recruiting activities in Japan and opened several commercial businesses. Maintains an Internet homepage that indicates Armageddon and anti-US sentiment remain a part of the cult's world view. *At the time of the Tokyo subway attack, the group claimed to have 9,000 members in Japan and up to 40,000 worldwide. Its current strength is unknown. Operates in Japan, but previously had a presence in Australia, Russia, Ukraine, Germany, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, and the United States.*
- **Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)*** a.k.a. Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna Founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles in Spain's Basque region and the southwestern French provinces of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, and Soule. Primarily bombings and assassinations of Spanish Government officials, especially security and military forces, politicians, and judicial figures. In response to French operations against the group, ETA also has targeted French interests. Finances its activities through kidnappings, robberies, and extortion. . The group has killed more than 800 persons since it began lethal attacks in the early 1960s. ETA was responsible for murdering six persons in 1998 but did not carry out any known killings in 1999. In late November, 1999, the ETA broke the "unilateral and indefinite" cease-fire it had held since 16 September 1998. *Operates primarily in the Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain and southwestern France, but also has bombed Spanish and*

French interests elsewhere. Has received training at various times in the past in Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Some ETA members allegedly have received sanctuary in Cuba. Also appears to have ties to the Irish Republican Army through the two groups' legal political wings.

- **Bin Ladin, Usama:** *The bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August 1998 underscored the global reach of Usama Bin Ladin--a long-time sponsor and financier of Sunni Islamic extremist causes--and his network. A series of public threats to drive the United States and its allies out of Muslim countries foreshadowed the attacks. The foremost threat was presented as a Muslim religious decree and published on 23 February 1998 by Bin Ladin and allied groups under the name "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders." The statement asserted that it was a religious duty for all Muslims to wage war on US citizens, military and civilian, anywhere in the world. Bin Ladin leads a broad-based, versatile organization. Suspects named in the wake of the Embassy bombings--four Egyptians, one Comoran, one Jordanian, three Saudis, one US citizen, one or possibly two Kenyan citizens, and one Tanzanian--reflect the range of al-Qaida operatives. The diverse groups under his umbrella afford Bin Ladin resources beyond those of the people directly loyal to him. With his own inherited wealth, business interests, contributions from sympathizers in various countries, and support from close allies like the Egyptian and South Asian groups that signed his so-called fatwa, he funds, trains, and offers logistic help to extremists not directly affiliated with his organization.*

Bin Ladin seeks to aid those who support his primary goal--driving US forces from the Arabian Peninsula, removing the Saudi ruling family from power, and "liberating Palestine"--or his secondary goals of removing Western military forces and overthrowing what he calls corrupt, Western-oriented governments in predominantly Muslim countries. To these ends, his organization has sent trainers throughout Afghanistan as well as to Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, and has trained fighters from numerous other countries, including the Philippines, Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, and Eritrea. Using the ties al-Qaida has developed, Bin Ladin believes he can call upon individuals and groups virtually worldwide to conduct terrorist attacks. His Egyptian and South Asian allies, for example, publicly threatened US interests in the latter half of 1998. Bin Ladin's own public remarks underscore his expanding interests, including a desire to obtain a capability to deploy weapons of mass destruction.

On 4 November indictments were returned in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York in connection with the two US Embassy bombings in Africa. Charged in the indictment were: Usama Bin Ladin, his military commander Muhammad Atef, and Wadiah El Hage, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Mohammed Sadeek Odeh, and Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, all members of al-Qaida. Two of these suspects, Odeh and al-Owhali, were turned over to US authorities in Kenya and brought to the United States to stand trial. Another suspect, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, was arrested in Germany and extradited to the United States in December. On 16 December five others were indicted for their role in the Dar es Salaam Embassy bombing: Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Fahid Mohommed Ally Msalam, and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan.

- **Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)** a.k.a. Continuity Army Council Radical terrorist group formed in 1994 as the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein, a political organization dedicated to the reunification of Ireland. Established to carry on the republican armed struggle after the Irish Republican Army announced a cease-fire in September 1994. Bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, and robberies. Targets include British military and Northern Irish security targets and Northern Irish Loyalist paramilitary groups. Also has launched bomb attacks against predominantly Protestant towns in Northern Ireland. Does not have an established presence or capability to launch attacks on the UK mainland. Fewer than 50 activists. *The group probably receives limited support from IRA hard-liners, who are dissatisfied with the IRA cease-fire, and other republican sympathizers. Suspected of receiving funds and arms from sympathizers in the United States.*
- **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)*** Marxist-Leninist organization founded in 1969 when it split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Believes Palestinian national goals can be achieved only through revolution of the masses. In early 1980s occupied political stance midway between Arafat and the rejectionists. Split into two factions in 1991; Nayif Hawatmah leads the majority and more hard-line faction, which continues to dominate the group. Joined with other

rejectionist groups to form the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) to oppose the Declaration of Principles signed in 1993. Broke from the APF--along with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)--over ideological differences. Has made limited moves toward merging with the PFLP since the mid-1990s. In the 1970s conducted numerous small bombings and minor assaults and some more spectacular operations in Israel and the occupied territories, concentrating on Israeli targets. *Involved only in border raids since 1988, but continues to oppose the Israel-PLO peace agreement. Conducts occasional guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon. Receives limited financial and military aid from Syria.*

- **al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)** The group issued a cease-fire in March 1999 and has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since August 1998. Signed Usama Bin Ladin's *fatwa* in February 1998 calling for attacks against US civilians but publicly has denied that it supports Bin Ladin. Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman is al-Gama'at's preeminent spiritual leader, and the group publicly has threatened to retaliate against US interests for his incarceration. Primary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state. Armed attacks against Egyptian security and other government officials, Coptic Christians, and Egyptian opponents of Islamic extremism. Al-Gama'at has launched attacks on tourists in Egypt since 1992, most notably the attack in November 1997 at Luxor that killed 58 foreign tourists. Also claimed responsibility for the attempt in June 1995 to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. *The Gama'at has never specifically attacked a US citizen or facility but has threatened US interests.*
- **HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)** Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various HAMAS elements have used both political and violent means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. Loosely structured, with some elements working clandestinely and others working openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda. HAMAS's strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and a few areas of the West Bank. Also has engaged in peaceful political activity, such as running candidates in West Bank Chamber of Commerce elections. In August 1999, Jordanian authorities closed the group's Political Bureau offices in Amman, arrested its leaders, and prohibited the group from operating on Jordanian territory. *Receives funding from Palestinian expatriates, Iran, and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. Some fundraising and propaganda activity take place in Western Europe and North America.*
- **Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)** Formerly the Harakat ul-Ansar, which was designated a foreign terrorist organization in October 1997. HUM is an Islamic militant group based in Pakistan that operates primarily in Kashmir. Leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil has been linked to Bin Ladin and signed his *fatwa* in February 1998 calling for attacks on US and Western interests. Operates terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan and suffered casualties in the US missile strikes on Bin Ladin-associated training camps in Khowst in August 1998. Fazlur Rehman Khalil subsequently said that HUM would take revenge on the United States. Has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. Linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August 1995, and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year. Has several thousand armed supporters located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, and also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rockets. Based in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan, but members conduct insurgent and terrorist activities primarily in Kashmir. The HUM trains its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. *Collects donations from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf and Islamic states and from Pakistanis and Kashmiris. The source and amount of HUA's military funding are unknown.*
- **Hizbollah (Party of God)*** a.k.a. Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine Radical Shia group formed in Lebanon; dedicated to creation of Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon and removal of all non-Islamic influences from the area. Strongly anti-West and anti-Israel. Closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran but may have conducted operations that were not approved by Tehran. *Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-US terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the US Embassy and*

US Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the US Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of US and other Western hostages in Lebanon. The group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992. Operates in the Bekaa Valley, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. Has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and elsewhere. Receives substantial amounts of financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran and Syria.

- **Irish Republican Army (IRA)** a.k.a. Provisional Irish, Republican Army (PIRA), the Provos Radical terrorist group formed in 1969 as clandestine armed wing of Sinn Fein, a legal political movement dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. Has a Marxist orientation. Organized into small, tightly knit cells under the leadership of the Army Council. Bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, and robberies. Before its cease-fire in 1994, targets included senior British Government officials, British military and Royal Ulster Constabulary targets in Northern Ireland, and a British military facility on the European Continent. The IRA has been observing a cease-fire since July 1997; the group's previous cease-fire was from 1 September 1994 to February 1996. *Has received aid from a variety of groups and countries and considerable training and arms from Libya and, at one time, the PLO. Is suspected of receiving funds and arms from sympathizers in the United States. Similarities in operations suggest links to the ETA.*
- **Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)** Coalition of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states opposed to Uzbekistani President Islam Karimov's secular regime. Goal is establishment of Islamic state in Uzbekistan. Recent propaganda also includes anti-Western and anti-Israeli rhetoric. Believed to be responsible for five car bombs in Tashkent in February. Instigated two hostage crises in Kyrgyzstan in the fall, including a two-and-one-half-month crisis in which IMU militants kidnapped four Japanese and eight Kyrgyzstanis. Militants probably number in the thousands. Most militants believed to be in Afghanistan in the winter (1999-2000), though some may have remained in Tajikistan. Area of operations includes Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Iran. *Support from other Islamic extremist groups in Central Asia. IMU leadership broadcasts statements over Iranian radio.*
- **Jamaat ul-Fuqra** Islamic sect that seeks to purify Islam through violence. Led by Pakistani cleric Shaykh Mubarik Ali Gilani, who established the organization in the early 1980s. Gilani now resides in Pakistan, but most cells are located in North America and the Caribbean. Members have purchased isolated rural compounds in North America to live communally, practice their faith, and insulate themselves from Western culture. Fuqra members have attacked a variety of targets that they view as enemies of Islam, including Muslims they regards as heretics and Hindus. *Attacks during the 1980s included assassinations and firebombings across the United States. Fuqra members in the United States have been convicted of criminal violations, including murder and fraud. Operates in North America and Pakistan.*
- **Japanese Red Army (JRA)*** a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB) An international terrorist group formed around 1970 after breaking away from Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction. Led by Fusako Shigenobu, believed to be in Syrian-garrisoned area of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Stated goals are to overthrow Japanese Government and monarchy and help foment world revolution. Organization unclear but may control or at least have ties to Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB). Also may have links to Antiwar Democratic Front, an overt leftist political organization in Japan. Details released following arrest in November 1987 of leader Osamu Maruoka indicate that JRA may be organizing cells in Asian cities, such as Manila and Singapore. *Has had close and longstanding relations with Palestinian terrorist groups--based and operating outside Japan--since its inception.* During the 1970s JRA conducted a series of attacks around the world, including the massacre in 1972 at Lod Airport in Israel, two Japanese airliner hijackings, and an attempted takeover of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. In April 1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested with explosives on the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning an attack to coincide with the bombing of a USO club in Naples and a suspected JRA operation that killed five, including a US servicewoman. Kikumura was convicted of these charges and is serving a lengthy prison sentence in the United States. In March 1995, Ekita Yukiko, a longtime JRA activist, was arrested in Romania and subsequently deported to Japan. Eight others have been arrested since 1996, but leader Shigenobu remains at large. *Location unknown, but possibly based in Syrian-controlled*

areas of Lebanon.

- **al-Jihad*** a.k.a. Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, Vanguard of Conquest, Talaa' al-Fateh Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the late 1970s. Appears to be divided into two factions: one led by Ayman al-Zawahiri--who currently is in Afghanistan and is a key leader in terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin's new World Islamic Front--and the Vanguard of Conquest (Talaa' al-Fateh) led by Ahmad Husayn Agiza. Abbud al-Zumar, leader of the original Jihad, is imprisoned in Egypt and recently joined the group's jailed spiritual leader, Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, in a call for a "peaceful front." Primary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state. Increasingly willing to target US interests in Egypt. Specializes in armed attacks against high-level Egyptian Government officials. The original Jihad was responsible for the assassination in 1981 of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Appears to concentrate on high-level, high-profile Egyptian Government officials, including cabinet ministers. Claimed responsibility for the attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. *Has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since 1993 and never has targeted foreign tourists there. Has threatened to retaliate against the United States, however, for its incarceration of Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman and, more recently, for the arrests of its members in Albania, Azerbaijan, and the United Kingdom. The Egyptian Government claims that Iran, Sudan, and militant Islamic groups in Afghanistan--including Usama Bin Ladin--support the Jihad factions. Also may obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental organizations.*
- **Kach* and Kahane Chai*** Stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Kach (founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir Kahane) and its offshoot Kahane Chai, which means "Kahane Lives," (founded by Meir Kahane's son Binyamin following his father's assassination in the United States) were declared to be terrorist organizations in March 1994 by the Israeli Cabinet under the 1948 Terrorism Law. This followed the groups' statements in support of Dr. Baruch Goldstein's attack in February 1994 on the al-Ibrahimi Mosque--Goldstein was affiliated with Kach--and their verbal attacks on the Israeli Government. *Have threatened to attack Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli Government officials. Claimed responsibility for several shootings of West Bank Palestinians that killed four persons and wounded two in 1993. Receives support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.*
- **Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)*** Established in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group primarily composed of Turkish Kurds. In recent years has moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism. Seeks to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, where the population is predominantly Kurdish. Primary targets are Turkish Government security forces in Turkey but the PKK has bombed tourist sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists. *Operates in Turkey, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Has received safehaven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Syrian Government claims to have expelled the PKK from its territory in October 1998.*
- **Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)*** Known front organizations: World Tamil Association (WTA), World Tamil Movement (WTM), the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT), the Ellalan Force, the Sangillan Force. The most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka, founded in 1976. Uses overt and illegal methods to raise funds, acquire weapons, and publicize its cause of establishing an independent Tamil state. Began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan Government in 1983 and relies on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist Controls most of the northern and eastern coastal areas of Sri Lanka and has conducted operations throughout the island. Headquartered in the Jaffna peninsula, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep track of any outsiders who enter the group's area of control. *The LTTE's overt organizations support Tamil separatism by lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations. Also uses its international contacts to procure weapons, communications, and bombmaking equipment. Exploits large Tamil communities in North America, Europe, and Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka. Some Tamil communities in Europe also are involved in narcotics smuggling.*
- **Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)** Extremist terrorist group formed in 1996 as a splinter of the mainstream loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Seeks to subvert a political settlement with Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland by attacking Catholic politicians, civilians, and Protestant politicians who endorse the

Northern Ireland peace process. Composed of hard-liners formerly associated with the UVF. Mark "Swinger" Fulton now leads the LVF following the assassination in December 1997 of LVF founder Billy "King Rat" Wright. Announced a unilateral cease-fire on 15 May 1998 and, in a move unprecedented among Ulster terrorist groups, decommissioned a small but significant amount of weapons on 18 December 1998. While the LVF decommissioned a small but significant amount of weapons in December 1998, it did not repeat this gesture in 1999. LVF bombs often have contained Powergel commercial explosives, typical of many loyalist groups. LVF attacks have been particularly vicious: LVF terrorists killed an 18-year old Catholic girl in July 1997 because she had a Protestant boyfriend. Murdered numerous Catholic civilians with no political or terrorist affiliations following Billy Wright's assassination. Also has conducted successful attacks against Irish targets in Irish border towns.

- **Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR):** Founded in 1983 as the armed wing of the Chilean Communist Party and named for the hero of Chile's war of independence against Spain. Splintered into two factions in the late 1980s, and one faction became a political party in 1991. The dissident wing FPMR/D is Chile's only remaining active terrorist group. FPMR/D attacks civilians and international targets, including US businesses and Mormon churches. In 1993, FPMR/D bombed two McDonald's restaurants and attempted to bomb a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant
- **Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO):** a.k.a. The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK), the People's Mujahidin of Iran (PMOI), National Council of Resistance (NCR), Muslim Iranian Student's Society (front organization used to garner financial support). Formed in the 1960s by the college-educated children of Iranian merchants, the MEK sought to counter what it perceived as excessive Western influence in the Shah's regime. Following a philosophy that mixes Marxism and Islam, has developed into the largest and most active armed Iranian dissident group. Its history is studded with anti-Western activity, and, most recently, attacks on the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad. Worldwide campaign against the Iranian Government stresses propaganda and occasionally uses terrorist violence. *During the 1970s the MEK staged terrorist attacks inside Iran and killed several US military personnel and civilians working on defense projects in Tehran. Supported the takeover in 1979 of the US Embassy in Tehran. In April 1992 conducted attacks on Iranian embassies in 13 different countries, demonstrating the group's ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. Recent attacks in Iran include three explosions in Tehran in June 1998 that killed three persons and the assassination of Asadollah Lajevardi, the former director of the Evin Prison. Recent attacks in Iran include three explosions in Tehran in June 1998 that killed three persons and the assassination in August 1998 of Asadollah Lajevardi, the former director of the Evin Prison. In April 1999, Brigadier General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, the deputy joint chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, was killed in Tehran by a MEK operative. In the 1980s the MEK's leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. Most resettled in Iraq by 1987. In the mid-1980s did not mount terrorist operations in Iran at a level similar to its activities in the 1970s. In recent years has claimed credit for a number of operations in Iran. Beyond support from Iraq, the MEK uses front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.*
- **National Liberation Army (ELN)—Colombia:** Pro-Cuban, anti-US guerrilla group formed in January 1965. Primarily rural based, although has several urban fronts, particularly in the Magdalena Medio region. Entered peace talks with Colombian Civil Society in mid-1998 and was preparing to participate in a national convention in early 1999. Conducted weekly assaults on oil infrastructure (typically pipeline bombings) and has inflicted massive oil spills. Extortion and bombings against US and other foreign businesses, especially the petroleum industry. Annually conducts several hundred kidnappings for profit, including foreign employees of large corporations. Forces coca and opium poppy cultivators to pay protection money and attacks government efforts to eradicate these crops.
- **New People's Army (NPA):** The guerrilla arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), NPA is an avowedly Maoist group formed in December 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the NPA has an active urban infrastructure to conduct terrorism and uses city-based assassination squads called sparrow units. Derives most of its funding from contributions of supporters and so-called revolutionary taxes extorted from local businesses. The NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, corrupt politicians,

and drug traffickers. Opposes any US military presence in the Philippines and attacked US military interests before the US base closures in 1992. Estimated between 6,000 to 8,000.

- **Orange Volunteers (OV):** Extremist Protestant terrorist group comprised largely of disgruntled Loyalist hard-liners who split from groups observing the cease-fire. OV seeks to prevent a political settlement with Irish nationalists by attacking Catholic civilian interests in Northern Ireland. Bombings, arson, beatings, possibly robberies. Possibly around 20 hardcore members, many of whom are experienced in terrorist tactics and bombmaking.
- **The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)*** Originated among militant Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s; a series of loosely affiliated factions rather than a cohesive group. Committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel through holy war. Because of its strong support for Israel, the United States has been identified as an enemy of the PIJ. Also opposes moderate Arab governments that it believes have been tainted by Western secularism. Has threatened to retaliate against Israel and the United States for the murder of PIJ leader Fathi Shaqaqi in Malta in October 1995. *Conducted suicide bombings against Israeli targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. Has threatened to attack US interests in Jordan. Receives financial assistance from Iran and limited assistance from Syria.*
- **Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)*** Broke away from the PFLP-GC in mid-1970s. Later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. Pro-PLO faction led by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), who became member of PLO Executive Committee in 1984 but left it in 1991. *The Abu Abbas-led faction has conducted attacks against Israel. Abbas's group also was responsible for the attack in 1985 on the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. A warrant for Abu Abbas's arrest is outstanding in Italy. Receives support mainly from Iraq. Has received support from Libya in the past.*
- **The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge):** Communist insurgency trying to overthrow the Cambodian Government. Under Pol Pot's leadership, conducted a campaign of genocide, killing more than 1 million persons during its four years in power in the late 1970s. Defections starting in 1996 and accelerating in spring 1998 appear to have shattered the Khmer Rouge as a military force, but hard-line remnants still may pose a threat in remote areas. Virtually has disintegrated as a viable insurgent organization because of defections, but hard-line remnants continue low-level attacks against government troops in isolated areas. Some small groups may have turned to banditry. Also targets Cambodian and ethnic Vietnamese villagers and occasionally has kidnapped and killed foreigners traveling in remote rural areas.
- **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP):** Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by George Habash as a member of the PLO. Joined the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) to oppose the Declaration of Principles signed in 1993 and has suspended participation in the PLO. Broke away from the APF, along with the DFLP, in 1996 over ideological differences. Has made limited moves toward merging with the DFLP since the mid-1990s. *Committed numerous international terrorist attacks during the 1970s. Since 1978 has conducted numerous attacks against Israeli or moderate Arab targets, including killing a settler and her son in December 1996. Receives most of its financial and military assistance from Syria and Libya.*
- **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC):** Split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics. Violently opposed to Arafat's PLO. Led by Ahmad Jabril, a former captain in the Syrian Army. *Closely tied to both Syria and Iran. Has conducted numerous cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Headquartered in Damascus with bases in Lebanon and cells in Europe. Receives logistic and military support from Syria and financial support from Iran.*
- **al-Qaida:** Established by Usama Bin Ladin about 1990 to bring together Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Current goal is to "reestablish the Muslim State" throughout the world. Works with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems "non-Islamic" and remove Westerners from

Muslim countries. Issued statement under banner of "The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against The Jews and Crusaders" in February 1998, saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens, civilian or military, and their allies everywhere. *Conducted the bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 7 August that killed at least 301 persons and injured more than 5,000 others. Claims to have shot down US helicopters and killed US servicemen in Somalia in 1993 and to have conducted three bombings targeted against the US troop presence in Aden, Yemen in December 1992. Linked to plans for attempted terrorist operations, including the assassination of the Pope during his visit to Manila in late 1994; simultaneous bombings of the US and Israeli Embassies in Manila and other Asian capitals in late 1994; the midair bombing of a dozen US trans-Pacific flights in 1995; and a plan to kill President Clinton during a visit to the Philippines in early 1995. Continues to train, finance, and provide logistic support to terrorist groups that support these goals. May have from several hundred to several thousand members. Also serves as the core of a loose umbrella organization that includes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, including factions of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Gama'at al-Islamiyya, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin. The Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam underscore al-Qaida's global reach. Bin Ladin and his key lieutenants reside in Afghanistan, and the group maintains terrorist training camps there. Bin Ladin, son of a billionaire Saudi family, is said to have inherited around \$300 million that he uses to finance the group. Al-Qaida also maintains money-making businesses, collects donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations.*

- **Qibla and People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD):** Qibla is a small radical Islamic group led by Achmad Cassiem, who was inspired by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini. Cassiem founded Qibla in the 1980s, seeking to establish an Islamic state in South Africa. PAGAD began in 1996 as a community anticrime group fighting drug lords in Cape Town's Cape Flats section. PAGAD now shares Qibla's anti-Western stance as well as some members and leadership. Though distinct, the media often treat the two groups as one. *Qibla routinely protests US policies toward the Muslim world and uses radio station 786 to promote its message and mobilize Muslims.* PAGAD is suspected of conducting 170 bombings and 18 other violent actions in 1998 alone. Qibla and PAGAD may have masterminded the bombing on 15 August of the Cape Town Planet Hollywood. Often use the front names Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO) and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders (MAIL) when anti-Western campaigns are launched. Qibla is estimated at 250 members. Police estimate there are at least 50 gunmen in PAGAD, and the size of PAGAD-organized demonstrations suggests it has considerably more adherents than Qibla. Operate mainly in the Cape Town area, South Africa's foremost tourist venue. Probably have ties to Islamic extremists in the Middle East.
- **Real IRA (RIRA)** a.k.a. True IRA Formed in February-March 1998 as clandestine armed wing of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, a "political pressure group" dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The 32-County Sovereignty Movement opposed Sinn Fein's adoption in September 1997 of the Mitchell principles of democracy and nonviolence and opposed the amendment in May 1998 of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, which lay claim to Northern Ireland. Former IRA "quartermaster general" Mickey McKevitt leads the group; Bernadette Sands-McKevitt, his common-law wife, is the vice-chair of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement. Most Real IRA activists are former IRA members; the group has inherited a wealth of experience in terrorist tactics and bombmaking. Targets include British military and police in Northern Ireland and Northern Irish Protestant communities. Claimed responsibility for the car bomb attack in Omagh, Northern Ireland on 15 August, which killed 29 and injured 220 persons. Announced a cease-fire after that bombing. Has attempted several unsuccessful bomb attacks on the UK mainland. *About 70 members, plus limited support from IRA hard-liners dissatisfied with the current IRA cease-fire and other republican sympathizers. Suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States. Press reports claim Real IRA leaders also have sought support from Libya.*
- **Red Hand Defenders (RHD)** Extremist terrorist group composed largely of Protestant hard-liners from loyalist groups observing a cease-fire. RHD seeks to prevent a political settlement with Irish nationalists by attacking Catholic civilian interests in Northern Ireland. RHD has carried out numerous pipe bombing and arson attacks against "soft" civilian targets such as homes, churches, and private businesses to cause

outrage in the republican community and to provoke IRA retaliation. RHD claimed responsibility for the car-bombing murder on 15 March of Rosemary Nelson, a prominent Catholic nationalist lawyer and human rights campaigner in Northern Ireland. Approximately 20 hardcore members, many of whom have considerable experience in terrorist tactics and bombmaking.

- **Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC):** The largest, best-trained, and best-equipped insurgent organization in Colombia. Established in 1964 as a rural-based, pro-Soviet guerrilla army. Organized along military lines and includes several urban fronts. Has been anti-United States since its inception. The FARC agreed in 1998 to enter into preliminary peace talks with the Colombian Government. The Pastrana administration demilitarized five large rural municipalities to meet FARC conditions for peace talks. (President Pastrana traveled to this area on 7 January 1999 to inaugurate peace talks with guerrilla leaders, although the FARC's senior-most leader failed to attend.) Still conducts bombings, murders, kidnappings, extortion, hijackings, as well as armed insurgent attacks against Colombian political, military, and economic targets. In March 1999 the FARC brutally murdered three US Indian rights activists on Venezuelan territory whom they had kidnapped in Colombia. Foreign citizens often are targets of FARC kidnappings for ransom. Has well-documented ties to narcotics traffickers, principally through the provision of armed protection. *During 1999 continued its bombing campaign against oil pipelines. Armed attacks against Colombian political, economic, military, and police targets. Many members pursue criminal activities, carrying out hundreds of kidnappings for profit annually. Foreign citizens often are targets of FARC kidnappings. Group has well-documented ties to narcotics traffickers, principally through the provision of armed protection for coca and poppy cultivation and narcotics production facilities, as well as through attacks on government narcotics eradication efforts. Approximately 8,000-12,000 armed combatants and an unknown number of supporters, mostly in rural areas.*
- **Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November):** Radical leftist group established in 1975 and named for the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that protested the military regime. *Anti-Greek establishment, anti-US, anti-Turkey, anti-NATO, and committed to the ouster of US bases, removal of Turkish military presence from Cyprus, and severing of Greece's ties to NATO and the European Union (EU). Possibly affiliated with other Greek terrorist groups. Initial attacks were assassinations of senior US officials and Greek public figures. Added bombings in 1980s. Since 1990 has expanded targets to include EU facilities and foreign firms investing in Greece and has added improvised rocket attacks to its methods.*
- **Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)*** a.k.a. Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), Dev Sol. Originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front. Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting, it espouses a Marxist ideology and is virulently anti-US and anti-NATO. *Finances its activities chiefly through armed robberies and extortion. Has concentrated attacks against current and retired Turkish security and military officials. Began a new campaign against foreign interests in 1990. Assassinated two US military contractors and wounded a US Air Force officer to protest the Gulf war. Launched rockets at US Consulate in Istanbul in 1992. Assassinated prominent Turkish businessman in early 1996, its first significant terrorist act as DHKP/C. Turkish authorities thwarted DHKP/C attempt in June 1999 to fire light antitank weapon at US Consulate in Istanbul. Conducts attacks in Turkey--primarily in Istanbul--Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Raises funds in Western Europe.*
- **Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA):** Extreme leftist group that developed from opposition to the military junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. Formed in 1971, ELA is a self-described revolutionary, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist group that has declared its opposition to "imperialist domination, exploitation, and oppression." *Strongly anti-US and seeks the removal of US military forces from Greece. In 1986 stepped up attacks on Greek Government and commercial interests. Raid on a safehouse in 1990 revealed a weapons cache and direct contacts with other Greek terrorist groups, including 1 May and Revolutionary Solidarity. In 1991, ELA and 1 May claimed joint responsibility for over 20 bombings. Greek police believe they have established a link between the ELA and the Revolutionary Organization 17 November. Has not claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack since January 1995.*

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL): Larger of Peru's two insurgencies, SL is among the world's most

ruthless guerrilla organizations. Formed in the late 1960s by then university professor Abimael Guzman. Stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with peasant revolutionary regime. Guzman's capture in September 1992 was a major blow, as were arrests of other SL leaders in 1995, defections, and Peruvian President Fujimori's amnesty program for repentant terrorists. Has engaged in particularly brutal forms of terrorism, including the indiscriminate use of bombs and selective assassinations. Conducted fewer attacks in 1998, generally limited to rural areas. Almost every institution in Peru has been a target of SL violence. It also opposes any influence by foreign governments, as well as by other Latin American guerrilla groups, especially the MRTA. Detonated explosives at diplomatic missions of several countries in Peru in 1990, including an attempt to car-bomb the US Embassy in December. Has bombed diplomatic missions of several countries in Peru, including the US Embassy. Conducts bombing campaigns Has attacked US businesses since its inception. Approximately 30,000 persons have died since Shining Path took up arms in 1980 in its aim to turn Peru into a Communist state. Although SL continued to clash with Peruvian authorities and military units, armed operations declined in 1999 because recent arrests have decimated the group's leadership. Membership is unknown but estimated to be a few hundred armed militants. SL's strength has been vastly diminished by arrests and desertions. Approximately 1,500 to 2,500 armed militants; larger number of supporters, mostly in rural areas.

- **Sikh Terrorism:** Sikh terrorism is sponsored by expatriate and Indian Sikh groups who want to carve out an independent Sikh state called Khalistan (Land of the Pure) from Indian territory. Active groups include Babbar Khalsa, International Sikh Youth Federation, Dal Khalsa, Bhinderanwala Tiger Force. A previously unknown group, the Saheed Khalsa Force, claimed credit for the marketplace bombings in New Delhi in 1997. Militant cells are active internationally and extremists gather funds from overseas Sikh communities. *Sikh expatriates have formed a variety of international organizations that lobby for the Sikh cause overseas. Most prominent are the World Sikh Organization and the International Sikh Youth Federation.*
- **Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA):** Traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement formed in 1983. Aims to rid Peru of imperialism and establish Marxist regime. Has suffered from defections and government counterterrorist successes in addition to infighting and loss of leftist support. Previously responsible for large number of anti-US attacks; recent activity has dropped off dramatically. Most members have been jailed. Nonetheless, in December 1996, 14 MRTA members overtook the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima during a diplomatic reception, capturing hundreds. Government forces stormed the residence in April, 1997 rescuing all but one of the remaining hostages. Has not conducted a significant terrorist operation since then. Believed to have fewer than 100 remaining members.
- **Al Ummah:** Radical Indian Muslim group founded in 1992 by S.A. Basha. Believed responsible for the Coimbatore bombings in Southern India in February 1998. Basha and 30 of his followers were arrested and await trial for those bombings.
- **Zviadists:** Extremist supporters of deceased former Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Following Gamsakhurdia's ouster in 1991, his supporters launched a revolt against his successor, Eduard Shevardnadze. Suppressed in late 1993, and Gamsakhurdia committed suicide in January 1994. Some Gamsakhurdia sympathizers have formed a weak legal opposition in Georgia, but others remain violently opposed to Shevardnadze's rule and seek to overthrow him. Some Gamsakhurdia government officials fled to Russia following Gamsakhurdia's ouster and now use Russia as a base of operations to bankroll anti-Shevardnadze activities. Attempted two assassinations against Shevardnadze in August 1995 and February 1998. *Took UN personnel hostage following the February 1998 attempt, but released the hostages unharmed. May have received support and training in Chechen terrorist training camps. Chechen mercenaries participated in the assassination attempt against Shevardnadze in February 1998. Zviadists conducted no violent activity in 1999.*

This list is only part of the roughly 130 groups that are normally labeled as terrorist, a list that excludes many foreign and domestic extremist groups and individuals, or "loners," by

definition. At the same time, it is so long, so diverse, and so unstable that it is tempting to ignore the real-world cases involved and talk in terms of generalities. It is only by looking at specific cases however, that both the diversity in the threat and the cumulative risk to US interests, US allies, and the US homeland becomes clear.

There are many additional groups that are opposed to friendly governments and might target Americans in retaliation for any US aid to the allied governments involved. The portion of the text describing each group that is shown in italics also shows that many groups have ties to hostile state actors, and that in many cases, states have provided them with explosives and weapons like anti-tank guided missiles and light anti-aircraft missiles. Furthermore, such movements can splinter with little or no warning, and into more extreme and violent factions and sub-factions. Coupled to the sometimes sudden emergence of major new anti-American groups like those led by Bin Laden, it is clear that threats can suddenly arise that would take extreme risks and which could seek vengeance or simply to kill as many Americans as possible,

In short, while no group on the current State Department list can be associated with any serious effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction except for Aum Shinrikyo, some have conducted large-scale conventional attacks on Americans, and foreign terrorism (a) poses a continuing risk to the American homeland and (b) is linked to state actors in ways that could both lead to the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and make it difficult to assign the blame for attacks.

Threats from Foreign Students and Immigrants

There are also less orthodox definitions of the foreign terrorist threat and include the potential threat from students and immigrants. The National Commission on Terrorism identified foreign students studying in the United States as potential threats in its June 2000 report:³⁰

Of the large number of foreign students who come to this country to study, there is a risk that a small minority may exploit their student status to support terrorist activity. The United States lacks the nationwide ability to monitor the immigration status of these students.

In spite of elaborate immigration laws and the efforts of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United States is, de facto, a country of open borders. The Commission found that the massive flows of people across U.S. borders make exclusion of all foreign terrorists impossible. There are more than 300

million legal crossings each year at the U.S./Mexican land border alone. Millions more stream through our airports.

Beyond the millions who legally come and go, over four million persons reside illegally in the United States. About half of them entered the country without inspection, meaning they crossed U.S. borders between inspection stations or entered by small boat or aircraft. Roughly another two million people entered the United States with a valid visitor's visa, but overstayed their visa and remained here to live. That said, of the millions who come here to live or visit only a minuscule portion of all foreigners in the United States attempt to harm the country in any way.

While the problems of controlling America's borders are far broader than just keeping out terrorists, the Commission found this an area of special concern. For example, thousands of people from countries officially designated as state sponsors of terrorism currently study in the United States. This is not objectionable in itself as the vast majority of these students contribute to America's diversity while here and return home with no adverse impact on U.S. national security. However, experience has shown the importance of monitoring the status of foreign students. Seven years ago, investigators discovered that one of the terrorists involved in bombing the World Trade Center had entered the United States on a student visa, dropped out, and remained illegally. Today, there is still no mechanism for ensuring the same thing won't happen again.

One program holds promise as a means of addressing the issue. The Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS), a regional pilot program mandated by the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIR/IRA) collects and makes readily available useful and current information about foreign student visa holders in the United States. For example, CIPRIS would record a foreign student's change in major from English literature to nuclear physics. The CIPRIS pilot program was implemented in 20 southern universities and is being considered for nationwide implementation after an opportunity for notice and comment. The Commission believes that CIPRIS could become a model for a nationwide program monitoring the status of foreign students.

One needs to be careful about such generic approaches to counter-terrorism. The Commission raises a potentially valid issue, but it is not clear that there is as yet any clear history of foreign students in the US actually going back to their original country to participate in the development of threats to the American homeland. At the same time, there are a massive number of illegals in the US that are not students or who never entered under student visas, and many American citizens with ties to foreign countries. It is difficult to argue with the idea that the US has a right to track the activities of foreign students in broad terms and to ensure that they comply with the law. At the same time, there is a thin margin between tracking and creating ethnic or national stereotypes and "threats" for which there is no real justification. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that many foreign students with advanced technical training stay in the US and play a critical role in contributing to the American economy.

Domestic Terrorists and Extremists

It is equally difficult to profile American terrorists and extremists, particularly because many are not associated with well-established ideologies and individuals and ad hoc factions can be as dangerous as organized groups. Louis Freeh summarized this threat as follows in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies on February 4, 1999:³¹

Domestic terrorist groups are those which are based and which operate entirely within the United States, or its territories, and whose activities are directed at elements of the United States Government or its civilian population. Domestic terrorist groups represent interests that span the full political spectrum, as well as social issues and concerns. FBI investigations of domestic terrorist groups or individuals are not predicated upon social or political beliefs; rather, they are based upon planned or actual criminal activity. The current domestic terrorist threat primarily comes from right-wing extremist groups, Puerto Rican extremist groups, and special interest extremists.

Right-wing Extremist Groups. The threat from right-wing extremist groups includes militias, white-separatist groups, and anti-government groups. All right-wing extremist groups tend to encourage massing weapons, ammunition and supplies in preparation for a confrontation with federal law enforcement, as well as local law enforcement who are often perceived as agents for the State/Federal government.

The goal of the militia movement is to defend and protect the United States Constitution from those who want to take away the rights of Americans. The militia movement believes that the United States Constitution gives Americans the right to live their lives without government interference. The FBI is not concerned with every single aspect of the militia movement since many militia members are law-abiding citizens who do not pose a threat of violence. The FBI focuses on radical elements of the militia movement capable and willing to commit violence against government, law enforcement, civilian, military and international targets (UN, visiting foreign military personnel). Not every state in the union has a militia problem. Militia activity varies from states with almost no militia activity (Hawaii, Connecticut) to states with thousands of active militia members (Michigan, Texas).

The American militia movement has grown over the last decade. Factors contributing to growth include:

- **GUNS-** The right to bear arms is an issue that almost all militia members agree and most militia members believe a conspiracy exists to take away their guns. The national system of instant background checks for all gun buyers, mandated by the 1993 Brady Act and which actually was implemented on November 30, 1998, has further angered many militia groups. These militia members see this new law as another example of how the government is conspiring to take away their guns. The banning of semiautomatic assault weapons has also angered many militia members.
- **STATE LAWS-** Militias resent state laws forbidding them to gather together to fire weapons. Sixteen states have laws that prohibit all militia groups and 17 states have laws that prohibit all paramilitary training.
- **MISTRUST OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT-** is frequently mentioned in militia literature and overall militia mythology. FBI and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) actions, such as Ruby Ridge, the Branch Davidians, and the Freeman standoff, are cited, and thus are hated

and distrusted by many militia members.

- TAXES- Militia members believe that they pay too many taxes and that those tax dollars are wasted by a huge, uncaring and inefficient bureaucracy in Washington, D.C. Since the Internal Revenue Service collects federal taxes, it is widely hated by militia members.
- THE UNITED NATIONS - is perceived as an organization bent on taking over the world and destroying American democracy and establishing "the New World Order." The New World Order theory holds that, one day, the United Nations will lead a military coup against the nations of the world to form a one-world government. United Nations troops, consisting of foreign armies, will commence a military takeover of America. The United Nations will mainly use foreign troops on American soil because foreigners will have fewer reservations about killing American citizens. Captured United States military bases will be used to help conquer the rest of the world.

Most of the militia movement has no racial overtones and does not espouse bigotry; there are some black and Jewish militia members. However, the pseudo-religion of Christian Identity, as well as other hate philosophies, have begun to creep into the militia movement. This scenario is currently being played out in the Michigan Militia, arguably the largest militia group in America. Lynn Van Huizen, leader of the Michigan Militia Corps, is currently trying to oust Christian Identity factions from his group. Christian Identity is a belief system that provides both a religious base for racism and anti-Semitism, and an ideological rationale for violence against minorities. This pattern of racist elements seeping into the militia movement is a disturbing trend, as it will only strengthen the radical elements of the militias.

Many white supremacist groups adhere to the Christian Identity belief system, which holds that the world is on the verge of a final apocalyptic struggle between God/Christ and Satan (The Battle of Armageddon) in which Aryans (European Caucasians) must fight Satan's heirs: Jews, nonwhites and their establishment allies (i.e., the Federal Government). The Christian Identity belief system (also known as Kingdom Identity) provides a religious base for racism and anti-Semitism, and an ideological rationale for violence against minorities and their white allies. Christian Identity teaches that the white race is the chosen race of God, whites are the "true Israelites" and Jews are the Children of Satan. Adherents believe that Jews have increasingly gained control of the United States Federal Government and are attempting to enslave the white population by enacting laws subjugating the white people, such as affirmative action, pro-choice, and anti-gun statutes.

To prepare for Armageddon, many Identity adherents engage in survivalist and paramilitary training, storing foodstuffs and supplies, and caching weapons and ammunition. As the next millennium approaches, Identity's more extreme members may take action to prepare for Armageddon, including armed robbery to finance the upcoming battle, destroying government property and infrastructure, and targeting Jews and nonwhites.

Due to Christian Identity adherents' widespread propaganda efforts and Identity's racist/anti-Semitic/anti-government appeal, there are a number of churches and diverse organizations throughout the United States that embrace the doctrines of Identity. Identity beliefs are also increasingly found in the rhetoric of all types of right-wing extremist groups, including, but not limited to, militias, survivalist communes, the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, skinheads, tax protesters, and common law courts. Thus, with the approaching millennium, there is a greater potential for members from such Identity influenced groups to engage in violent activities as well.

As the next millennium approaches, violent and illegal acts may increase, due to Christian Identity's belief that the world is on the verge of a final apocalyptic struggle (a.k.a. The Battle of Armageddon) between God/Christ and Satan. Identity members believe that this entails Aryans (European Caucasians) fighting Satan's heirs (Jews, non-whites, and their establishment allies). To prepare, Identity adherents engage in survivalist and paramilitary training. As the year 2000 approaches, more extreme members may take action

to prepare for or bring about "Armageddon," including armed robbery to finance the upcoming battle, destroying government property and targeting Jews and non-whites.

Other Anti-Government Groups. The other right-wing anti-government groups include Freemen, "sovereign" citizens, and common law courts. The Freemen and sovereign citizens believe they have the right to renounce their citizenship, after which they do not have to comply with any laws or rules and the federal government would have no influence over them. In addition, some, like the Freemen, believe they have the right to issue their own money that is called "certified comptroller warrants."

Some members of the right-wing have formed their own system of laws to enforce and follow (called common law courts) to replace the existing court system. The common law courts have no basis in jurisprudence, but participants claim legitimacy based on the laws of the Old Testament, English common law, the Magna Carta and commercial law. Some common law courts have issued arrest warrants, but as of yet, there are no reports that any of these arrests have been accomplished.

Puerto Rican Extremist Groups. A resurgence in Puerto Rican extremism has occurred in the past six months. A nearly decade-long hiatus in terrorist activity ended on March 31, 1998, with the detonation of an incendiary device at the "Superaqueduct" construction project in Arecibo, Puerto Rico. On June 9, 1998, a bomb exploded outside a branch of Banco Popular in Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico. The EPB-Macheteros publicly claimed responsibility for both attacks, citing environmental concerns and opposition to the privatization of the Puerto Rico Telephone Company.

Puerto Rican extremism remains a concern to the FBI. Traditionally, the Puerto Rican Terrorists have targeted United States establishments and interests in an effort to gain Puerto Rican independence. On December 13, 1998, Puerto Ricans voted in a non-binding referendum concerning Puerto Rico's political status. Voters were given the opportunity to vote for independence, continued commonwealth status, statehood, free association, or none of the above. Independence garnered precious little support in the referendum, receiving a mere 2.5% of the vote, according to media reports. Despite the lack of popular support for independence, militant independence activists continue to pursue independence through illegal means. Recently, July 25, 1998 marked the 100-year anniversary of the United States invasion of Puerto Rico during the Spanish-American War. In addition, several convicted Puerto Rican terrorists remain incarcerated within the federal prison system, and militant pro-independence activists continue to lobby for their release. The militant independentistas may engage in violence as a response to the prisoners' continued incarceration, or as a symbolic commemoration of over 100 years of American control over the island.

Special Interest Extremists. Special interest or single issue extremists advocate violence and/or criminal activity with the goal of effecting change in policy vis a vis one specific aspect of society. The most recognizable single issue terrorists at the present time are those involved in the violent animal rights, anti-abortion, and environmental protection movements. Each of these issues evoke strong emotions within society at large, and violent aberrants continue to tarnish the legitimate public debate on each issue.

The FBI continues to vigorously investigate various bombings of abortion clinics and incidents of violence targeting abortion providers across the country. The January 1998 bombing of an abortion clinic in Birmingham, Alabama, has resulted in a significant allocation of FBI manpower and resources to the investigation of the bombing. The recent assassination of Dr. Barnett Slepian in Buffalo, New York, serves as an acute reminder of the very real threat posed by anti-abortion extremists.

Animal rights extremists continue to pose significant challenges for law enforcement as well. Various arsons and other incidents of property destruction have been claimed by the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). For example, on October 19, 1998, the Vail Ski Resort suffered a series of arson attacks that damaged or destroyed eight separate structures and resulted in approximately \$12 million in property damage. In a communiqué issued to various news agencies in Colorado, ELF

claimed responsibility for the arsons in retaliation for the resort's plans to expand its ski areas. The group claimed that the proposed expansion would destroy the last remaining habitat in Colorado for the lynx.

Although the frequency of terrorist incidents within the United States has decreased in number, the potential for destruction has increased as terrorists have turned toward large improvised explosive devices to inflict maximum damage. The ease with which people can obtain the recipes for manufacturing explosives and developing chemical and biological weapons facilitates the potential of a major incident. As technology and materials become more accessible, the possibility of misuse and subsequent fatalities increases. One has only to look at the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building, in Oklahoma City, to see the devastating potential for a terrorist act. Prior to April 19, 1995, no one would have believed that Americans would commit such a tragic act against other Americans. But they did, and the potential for another such incident continues.

The Oklahoma City bombing showed that “loners” and leaders, ill-informed extremist groups can pose a major threat. At the same time, the US has a long history of disturbed individuals who have attempted mass killings. Virtually all of the killings to date have been carried out by using automatic weapons and bombs, but there is no clear reason that this should be true in the future. “Loner” mass killings in the US are generally carried out by well-educated white males, most of which are fully functional and capable of working at complex tasks.³² Nothing precludes them from using simple chemical devices and biological weapons in the future.

The Implications of Past Terrorist Attacks

The US government lacks any standard way of defining and reporting the patterns in actual acts of terrorism in the US homeland. The FBI reporting of such acts since 1990 is, however, summarized in Table Four. The largest number of terrorist strikes have occurred in the Western States and Puerto Rico. Attacks in Puerto Rico accounted for about 60 percent of all terrorist incidents between 1983 and 1991 that occurred on United States territory.³³

Table FourChronological Summary of Terrorist Incidents in the US: 1990-1997

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Incident Type</u>	<u>Group</u>
1-12-90	Santurce, P.R.	Pipe Bombing	Brigada Internacionalista Eugenio Maria de Hostos de las Fuerzas Revolucionarias Pedro Albizu Campos (Eugenio Maria de Hostos International Brigade of the Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces)
1-12-90	Carolina, P.R.	Pipe Bombing	Brigada Internacionalista Eugenio Maria de Hostos de las Fuerzas Revolucionarias Pedro Albizu Campos (Eugenio Maria de Hostos International Brigade of the Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces)
2-22-90	Los Angles, Calif.	Bombing	Up the IRS, Inc.
4-22-90	Santa Cruz County	Malicious Destruction	Earth Night Action Group Calif. of Property
5-27-90	Mayaguez, P.R.	Arson	Unknown Puerto Rican Group
9-17-90	Arecibo, P.R.	Bombing	Pedro Albizu Group Revolutionary Forces
9-17-90	Vega Baja, P.R.	Bombing	Pedro Albizu Group Revolutionary Forces
2-3-91	Mayaguez, P.R.	Arson	Popular Liberation Army (PLA)
2-18-91	Sabana Grande, P.R.	Arson	Popular Liberation Army (PLA)
3-17-91	Carolina, P.R.	Arson	Unknown Puerto Rican Group
4-1-91	Fresno, Calif.	Bombing	Popular Liberation Army (PLA)
7-6-91	Punta Borinquen P.R.	Bombing	Popular Liberation Army (PLA)
4-5-92	New York, N.Y.	Hostile Takeover	Mujahedin-E-Khalq (MEK)
11-19-92	Urbana, Ill.	Attempted Firebombing	Mexican Revolutionary Movement
12-10-92	Chicago, Ill.	Car Fire and Attempted Firebombing (two incidents)	Boricua Revolutionary Front
2-26-93	New York, N.Y.	Car Bombing	International Radical Terrorists. The bombing in the parking garage of the World Trade Center kills 5 and wound over 1,000 of others. It leaves a crater 200 X 100 feet wide and five stories deep. The World Trade Center is the second largest building in the world and house 100,000 people on work days.
7-20-93	Tacoma, Wash.	Pipe Bombing	American Front Skinheads
7-22-93	Tacoma, Wash.	Bombing	American Front Skinheads
11-27/28/93	Chicago, Ill.	(nine incidents)	Firebombing Animal Liberation Front

THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM IN 1994

4-19-95	Oklahoma City, Okla.	Truck Bombing	Pending Investigation
4-1-96	Spokane, Wash.	Pipe Bomb/Bank	Robbery Phineas Priesthood
7-12-96	Spokane, Wash.	Pipe Bomb/Bank	Robbery Phineas Priesthood
7-27-96	Atlanta, Ga.	Pipe Bomb	Pending Investigation
1-2-97	Washington, D.C.	Letterbomb	Pending Investigation
1-2-97	Leavenworth, Kans.	Letterbomb	Pending Investigation

Source: FBI, Terrorism in the United States, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division, 1997

It is important to note that only two incidents in these FBI statistics – the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 -- have approached the level of violence that indicates that some response is required that goes beyond normal law enforcement and the existing counterterrorism capabilities of the Department of Justice.

Press reports produce the appearance of a more threatening environment that law enforcement reports, but this appearance does not seem to reflect the reality. Work by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies highlights the fact that many of the apparent increases in CBRN terrorism are the result of hoaxes and different methods of report. The Center's effort to use media to find such instances found 175 reports of chemical, biological, and nuclear terrorism in 1999, of which 104 occurred in the United State. This was a major apparent rise since the Center's data base contained a total 687 incidents since 1900 as of February 23, 2000. Taken at face value, 25% of all record incidents occurred in 1999 alone. At total of 35% of the 494 biological incidents that occurred during 1900 to 1999 occurred in 1999. Most of these incidents, however, were part of a flood of false reports of Anthrax threats that began in October 1998. A total of 81 out of the 104 incidents reported in the US were Anthrax threats, and 85 of the 104 incidents were hoaxes or pranks. Aside from hoaxes, here was one token possession of Ricin in the US, one token possession of Sarin, and two personal attacks using Cyanide. Interestingly enough, 55 out of the 104 incidents in the US had a criminal motive, and only 49 could be assigned any kind of political or ideological motive. While the US was to focus of false reports of biological attacks, a total of 99 of the 175 incidents worldwide were hoaxes or pranks. Most of the actual use of agents consisted of tear gas. There was one report of a radiological incident and two involving nuclear facilities, neither of which were confirm.³⁴

At the same time, no one can dismiss the fact that even one incident that involved a weapon of mass destruction could have catastrophic effects, and that extremists have attempted to use such weapons against the American homeland. More lethal attacks have been attempted in the past. Covert terrorist and extremist efforts to use weapons of mass destruction against targets in the US date back to the extensive efforts German agents made to use biological warfare to attack US agriculture during World War I. Domestic terrorists from an organization called RISE

actively attempted to use typhoid and a number of other diseases as biological weapon against US targets as early as 1972.³⁵ Muharem Kurbegovic, the psychologically disturbed “alphabet bomber,” attempted to use chemical weapons in 1973-1974.³⁶ The Rajneeshees, a cult in Oregon, successfully used bioterrorism in the form of food poisoning using Salmonella an effort to influence local politics during August-September 1984.³⁷ Other organizations, like the Arm of the Lord, were detected attempting to poison water supplies in the mid-1980s, and right wing groups like the Minnesota Patriots Council were detected trying to obtain biological agents in the early 1990s.³⁸

The bombing of the United States Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; and the bomb that detonated near the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya on August 7, 1998; are grim warning of how lethal new attacks in the US could be even if they do not involve CBRN weapons. The toll in both bombings, in terms of lives lost, persons injured, and damage to buildings, was substantial. In Dar es Salaam, 11 persons were killed, 7 of whom were foreign service nationals employed by the United States at the Embassy. Another 74 persons were injured, including 2 American citizens and 5 foreign service nationals. In Nairobi, where the United States Embassy was located in a congested downtown area, 213 persons were killed, including 12 American citizens and 32 foreign service nationals employed at the Embassy. Approximately 4,500 persons were treated for injuries, including 13 Americans and 16 foreign service nationals.

Similar threats emerge when one looks beyond statistics and at FBI and State Department descriptions of the incidents involved. Other recent attacks and plots involving Americans or American interests include:

- The 1993 murders of two Central Intelligence Agency employees and the wounding of several others by Mir Amal Kasi in Langley, Virginia;
- The March 1995 attack against three employees of the United States consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, which resulted in the deaths of two Americans;
- The July 1995 hostage taking of four western tourists, including an American, by terrorists in Kashmiri, India;
- The plot by Shayk Omar Abdel Rahman and his followers to bomb several New York

- City landmarks, including the United Nations building, the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, and federal buildings;
- The November 1995 bombing of a Saudi Arabian National Guard building in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which resulted in the deaths of five United States citizens assigned to the United States military training mission to Saudi Arabia;
 - The June 1996 bombing at the Al-Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which resulted in the deaths of 19 United States servicemen and the injury of 240 other military personnel and dependents;
 - A plot led by Ramzi Yousef to destroy numerous United States air carriers in a simultaneous operation;
 - A plot, also led by Ramzi Yousef, to kidnap and kill United States diplomats and foreign officials in Pakistan;
 - The November 1997 ambush and massacre of foreign tourists in Luxor, Egypt, which appears to have been undertaken to pressure the United States Government to release Shayk Rahman from federal prison;
 - The November 1997 murder of four United States businessmen and their driver in Karachi, Pakistan, believed to be in retaliation against the FBI's capture and rendition of Mir Amal Kasi;
 - The kidnapping of seven Americans during 1998 in Colombia by terrorists groups, bringing to 92 the total number of United States citizens reported kidnapped in that country between 1980 and 1998, of which 12 Americans have died in captivity;
 - The arrest in February 1998 of Larry Wayne Harris for packaging a vaccine strain of Anthrax, and claiming to attack Las Vegas;
 - The December 1998 kidnapping of a group of western tourists, including two Americans, by terrorists in Yemen, during which four hostages were killed and one American hostage wounded when Yemeni security forces attempted a rescue operation;
 - In mid-December, 1999, U.S. authorities arrested Ahmed Ressay, an Algerian national, as he entered the United States from Canada at Port Angeles, Washington. The vehicle he was driving was carrying explosives and detonating devices. The Government of Canada cooperated closely in the follow-up investigation into Ressay's activities and associates in Canada. Some Algerians arrested in connection with this case apparently are "Afghan alumni," who trained with the *mujahidin* in Afghanistan and are linked to Usama Bin Ladin. Canada has a longstanding cooperative relationship with the United States on counterterrorist matters, and the two countries meet regularly to discuss ways to enhance this cooperation and improve border security. While a potentially serious incident was avoided with Ressay's arrest, at year end both Canada and the United States remained concerned about the possibility of a heightened threat of terrorism in North America, and the two countries

were exploring new mechanisms for exchanging information on individuals with links to terrorism.

The existence of domestic paramilitary groups or “militias” poses a particular threat in the sense that some such groups already have attempted to use weapons of mass destruction and that they are organized to attack American civil society. There is no precise count of such groups, but various recent estimates indicate that there are some 435-800 “patriot” groups, and that 171-441 are identifiable militia groups – a number which does not include so-called “phantom cell” groups like the one that Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber believed in. The lower range of this estimate of “patriot” groups excludes some 457 active “hate” groups, and this separation of “patriot” and “hate” groups seems the more valid approach. According to some law enforcement estimates, some 300,000 people may belong to the “patriot” and “hate” groups, although the overwhelming majority pose of these people have no tendency toward violence and pose no threat to anyone.³⁹

Probability versus Probability Theory

There is a large range of literature that attempts to identify the most probable sources of attacks on the American homeland, and the most probable forms of terrorist attack. While such literature is sometime useful, it can also be highly misleading. Searching for the most probable form of one or several of the virtually countless variations of low probability attacks is simply terrible mathematics. It is a fundamental principle of probability theory that under these conditions, the cumulative probability of a truly low probability event occurring will always be higher than the cumulative probability of a small set of the slightly higher probability events. Put more simply, history shows that contingency and scenario analysis is at best diagnostic, not predictive and that it is the wild card that is most likely to actually be played.

Those who try to argue that today’s identifiable threats from state actors, terrorists, and extremists present a clear and decisive rationale for extensive homeland defense programs dealing with CBRN attacks are stretching the evidence beyond its limits. At the same time those who argue such programs are not necessary on the grounds that such threats cannot be clearly and decisively identified ignore very real risks. It would be much easier to shape US programs if this

was not the case, but there are times when the US must learn to live with complexity and uncertainty and the reality it will have to continuously modify its programs and policies to deal with such threats as they do or do not evolve.

¹ United States General Accounting Office, GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, "Combating Terrorism, Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy," GAO/NSIAD-97-254, September 1997, p. 15.

² GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, "Combating Terrorism," April 23, 1998, P. 3.

³ GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, "Combating Terrorism," April 23, 1998, P. 4.

⁴ See 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2656f(d). The term noncombatant includes military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. This legislation also requires the State Department to submit annual reports to Congress on international terrorism.

⁵ GAO/NSIAD-97-254, "Combating Terrorism," Page 16.

⁶ www.fema.gov/library/terror.htm

⁷ GAO/NSIAD-97-254 Combating Terrorism Page 16; First Annual Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1. Assessing the Threat, December 15, 1999, p. iii, www.rand.org/organisation/nsrd/terpanel.

⁸ Bruce Hoffman, Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum, Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 1993, p. 3.

⁹ National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, June, 2000, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>

¹⁰ The State Department does not distinguish the type of terrorist responsible for attacks.

¹¹ General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy," Report, 09/26/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-254).

¹² General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy," Report, 09/26/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-254).

¹³ Adapted from US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism.. 1998, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 1999, www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/sponsor.html

¹⁴ Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness, Program Focus and Efficiency, (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, November 12, 1998); Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO-T-NSIAD-99-16, October 2, 1998); Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessment of Chemical and Biological Attacks (GAO-T-NSIAD-99-163, September 1999).

¹⁵ Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness, Program Focus and Efficiency, (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, November 12, 1998); Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO-T-NSIAD-99-16, October 2, 1998); Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks (GAO-T-NSIAD-99-163, September 1999).

¹⁶ Statement for the Record of Louis J. Freeh, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation on “Threats to U. S. National Security,” Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 28, 1998, www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/congress98/threats.htm;

¹⁷ Statement for the Record of Mrs. Barbara Y. Martinez Deputy Director, National Domestic Preparedness Office Federal Bureau of Investigation on Preparedness for Terrorism Response Before the United States House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management, June 9, 1999, www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/congress99/comterr.htm

¹⁸ Statement by Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on “The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security,” as prepared for delivery, 21 March 2000

¹⁹ Stephen E. Flynn, draft version of “Border Control Blues, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, November-December, 2000.

²⁰ Stephen E. Flynn, draft version of “Border Control Blues, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, November-December, 2000.

²¹ Stephen E. Flynn, draft version of “Border Control Blues, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, November-December, 2000.

²² Adapted from US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 2000, www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999Report/sponsor.html

²³ Adapted from US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 2000, www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999Report/sponsor.html

²⁴ National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, June, 2000, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>

²⁵ Department of Defense, Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Annual Report to the Congress, Washington, Department of Defense, March., 2000, pp. 6-10

²⁶ Adapted from US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 1999, www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/sponsor.html, and Adapted from US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 2000, www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999Report/sponsor.html.

²⁷ www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/congress99/freehct2.htm.

²⁸ Adapted from US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 1999, www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/sponsor.html, and Adapted from US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 2000, www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999Report/sponsor.html.

²⁹ The State Department list includes groups that were designated foreign terrorist organizations on 8 October 1997 pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (denoted by an asterisk) but also includes other major groups that were active in 1998. Terrorist groups whose activities were limited in scope in 1998 are not included.

³⁰ National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, June, 2000, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>

³¹ www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/congress99/freehct2.htm.

³² See the series in the New York Times, April 8-12, 2000.

³³ www.fema.gov/library/terror.htm.

³⁴ Gavin Cameron, Jaspon Pate, Diana MCCAuley, and Libsay DeFazio, "1999 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials," The Non-Proliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 157-174.

³⁵ See the work by Seth Carus in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed, Toxic Terror, Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Cambridge, Belfer Center for Scientific and International Affairs, 2000, pp. 55-70.

³⁶ See the work by Jeffrey D. Simon in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed, Toxic Terror, Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Cambridge, Belfer Center for Scientific and International Affairs, 2000, pp. 71-94.

³⁷ See the work of Seth Carus in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed, Toxic Terror, Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Cambridge, Belfer Center for Scientific and International Affairs, 2000, pp. 116-137.

³⁸ See the work of Jessica Eve Stern in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed, Toxic Terror, Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Cambridge, Belfer Center for Scientific and International Affairs, 2000, pp. 139-157, and by Jonathan B. Tucker and Jason Pate, pp. 160-. Also see Morris Dees, Gathering Storm: America's Militia Threat, Harper Collins, 1996

³⁹ Estimates of membership as high as 12 million have been made but seem absurd. For a partial list see "The Militia Watchdog Links Page, www.militia.watchdog.org/ml.htm